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Abstract 
This paper analyzes peer effects among university scientists. Specifically, it investigates whether the 
number of peers and their average quality affects the productivity of researchers in physics, chemistry, 
and mathematics. The usual endogeneity problems related to estimating peer effects are addressed by 
using the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government as a source of exogenous variation in the peer 
group of scientists staying in Germany. Using a newly constructed panel dataset covering the universe 
of physicists, chemists, and mathematicians at all German universities from 1925 until 1938 I 
investigate peer effects at the local level and among co-authors. There is no evidence for localized 
peer effects, as neither department level (e.g. the physics department) nor specialization level (e.g. all 
theoretical physicists in the department) peers affect a researcher's productivity. Among co-authors, 
however, there is strong and significant evidence that peer quality affects a researcher's productivity. 
Loosing a co-author of average quality reduces the productivity of an average scientist by about 13 
percent in physics and 16.5 percent in chemistry. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This  paper  analyzes peer  effects  among universi ty scient is ts .  I t  i s  widely bel ieved that  
peer  effects  are  important  among academic researchers .  However ,  when individual  
researchers  choose the best  universi ty  to  carry out  their  research they do not  
necessar i ly  consider  these effects .  This  may resul t  in  a  misal locat ion of  ta lent  and 
under investment  in  academic research.  Having a  good understanding of  peer  effects  is  
therefore  crucial  for  researchers  and pol icy makers  al ike.  Despi te  the widespread 
bel ief  in  the presence of  peer  effects  among universi ty researchers  there is  only 
l imited  empir ical  evidence for  these effects .   
This  is  due to  the fact  that  obtain ing causal  es t imates  of  peer  effects  is  very 
chal lenging.  An important  problem for  any est imation of  peer  ef fects  is  caused by 
sor t ing of  scient is ts .  Highly product ive scient is ts  of ten work alongside other  
product ive researchers.  I f  sor t ing is  taking place i t  i s  not  c lear  whether  successful  
sc ient is ts  are  more product ive because they are col laborat ing with  successful  peers  or  
because their  productiv i ty  is  h igher  per  se .  Another  problem complicat ing the 
est imation of  peer  effects  is  the presence of  unobservable  factors  which affect  a  
researcher’s  product iv ity  but  a lso  the product iv i ty  of  h is  peers .  The construct ion of  a  
new laboratory which the econometr ician  cannot  observe,  may be such a  factor .  Most  
of  these unobserved factors  would lead to  an upward bias  of  peer  effect  es t imates .  
Fur thermore,  es t imates of  peer  effects  may be dis tor ted because of  measurement  
problems.  In  th is  context  the main  problem is  the correct  measurement  of  a  
researcher’s  peer  group.  I t  is  not  only d iff icul t  to  ident ify the peers  of  any given 
scient is t  but  a lso  to  quant ify  the qual i ty  of  these peers .  A promising s tra tegy to  obtain 
unbiased est imates  of  peer  effects  is  therefore to  analyze a  scient is t’s  product iv i ty if  
h is  peer  group changes due to  reasons which are  unrelated to h is  own product iv i ty.    
This  paper  proposes the d ismissal  of  scient is ts  by the Nazi  government  as  an 
exogenous and dramatic  change in the peer  group of  researchers  in  Germany.  Almost  
immediately af ter  Hit ler’s  Nat ional  Social is t  par ty secured power in  1933 the Nazi  
government d ismissed al l  Jewish and so  cal led  "pol i t ical ly  unrel iable"  scholars  from 
German universi t ies .  Around 13 to  18 percent  of  a l l  scientis ts  were d ismissed between 
1933 and 1934 (13.6  percent  of  physicis ts ,  13.1  of  chemists ,  and 18.3  percent  of  
mathematicians) .  Many of  the d ismissed scholars  were outs tanding members  of  their  
profession,  among them the famous physicis t  and Nobel  Laureate  Alber t  Einste in,  the 
chemist  Georg von Hevesy who received the Nobel Pr ize in  1943,  and the Hungar ian 
mathematician Johann von Neumann.  Scient is ts  a t  the affected  depar tments  were thus  
exposed to a  dramatic  change in  their  peer  group.  This  shock persis ted  unt i l  the end of  
my sample per iod because the major i ty  of  the open posi t ions could  not  be f i l led 
immediately.  Scient is t  in  departments  without  Jewish or  "pol i t ical ly  unreliable"  
scholars  d id not  exper ience any dismissals  and thus no change to their  peer  group.   
In  th is  paper  I  use the  d ismissal  to  ident ify peer  effects  among physicis ts ,  
chemists ,  and mathematic ians .  I  focus on these subjects  because advancements  in  
these f ie lds are  widely bel ieved to be an important  source of  technological  progress .  
Furthermore,  a  scient is t ’s  product iv i ty  can be well  approximated by analyzing 
publ icat ions in  academic journals .  Scient ists  publ ished their  resul ts  in  refereed 
scient if ic  journals  a lready in  the 1920s and 1930s,  the t ime per iod s tudied in  th is  
paper .  Another  reason for  concentrat ing on the sciences is  the at tempt of  the Nazi  
regime to ideologize al l  par ts  of  society af ter  1933.  These pol icies  also affected   
university research. The impact on di¤erent subjects, however, varied a lot. Subjects such as
economics, psychology, history, or sociology were a¤ected much more than the sciences.1 The
last reason for focusing on physics, chemistry, and mathematics is the fact that researchers at
German universities were among the leading gures in those elds in the early 20th century.
Examples for the leading role of German science at the time are the Nobel Prize awards to
researchers from German universities. Between 1910 and 1940, 27 percent of Nobel laureates
in physics and 42 percent of Nobel prize winners in chemistry were a¢ liated with a German
university. This is a much larger fraction than that of any other country at the time. If peer ef-
fects are an important determinant of a researchers productivity they are likely to be especially
important in a ourishing research environment such as Germany in the early 20th century.
In order to investigate peer e¤ects, I use historical university calenders to construct a panel
dataset of the universe of physicists, chemists, and mathematicians teaching at all 33 universities
in Germany from 1925 until 1938. I do not consider the years after 1938 because of the start of
World War II in 1939. I also compile a list of all dismissals from a number of di¤erent archival
sources. Finally, I obtain data on publications and citations of these researchers in the leading
academic journals of the time. More details on the data sources are given in the data section
below.
The collaboration of researchers can take di¤erent levels of intensity. A very direct way
of peer interaction is the collaboration on joint research projects involving joint publication of
results. There are, however, more subtle interactions of colleagues in universities. Scientists
may also discuss ideas and comment on each others work without copublishing any of their
work. Yet another way in which peers may a¤ect a researchers productivity is through peer
pressure. A scientists work e¤ort may depend on the e¤ort of his peers because he may want to
match or surpass their research output. Having more (less) productive peers would thus increase
(reduce) a researchers productivity. The denition of peer e¤ects in this paper encompasses
any of these di¤erent types.
In addition to these di¤erent levels in the intensity of peer interactions there are two main
dimensions of peer groups which matter for academic research. The rst dimension is the
number of peers a researcher can interact with. Another important dimension of a scientists
peer group is the quality of his colleagues. This paper is the rst to separately identify the
importance of these two aspects of peer interactions.
Another novelty of this paper is that my setup allows me to investigate di¤erent geographic
dimensions of spill-over e¤ects. I can analyze localized peer e¤ects at the level of a scientists
department (e.g. the physics department) and specialization within his department (e.g. among
theoretical physicists within the department). The dismissal is a very strong and precise predic-
tor of changes in the number and the average quality of peers at the local level. I nd, however,
that neither the number of dismissed colleagues nor the dismissal induced reduction in average
1The sciences were not completely una¤ected by the Nazi regime. The most famous example is the "German
Physics" movement by a small group of physicists trying to ideologize physical research. The consensus among
historians of science, however, is that the movement never mangaged to have a strong impact on the physics
community. See Beyerchen (1977) for details.
3
peer quality signicantly a¤ects the productivity of physicists, chemists or mathematicians at
the local level. I also estimate a more structural model of peer e¤ects instrumenting for the
number of peers and their average quality with the dismissal. I do not nd any signicant
e¤ects of the number of peers or their average quality at the department or specialization level.
The standard errors of these estimates are small. These results therefore indicate that localized
peer e¤ects do not play a role in this environment.
In addition to those localized peer e¤ects I investigate peer e¤ects among coauthors for
physics and chemistry. Due to the very low level of coauthorship in mathematics I cannot
analyze spill-over e¤ects for coauthors in mathematics. I nd that losing a coauthor of average
quality reduces the average researchers productivity by about 13 percent in physics and 16.5
percent in chemistry. Losing coauthors of higher than average quality leads to an even larger
productivity loss. Furthermore, I show that the e¤ect is solely driven by recent collaborations.
The productivity of scientists who lose a colleague with whom they did not coauthor in the
last four years before the dismissal does not fall after the dismissal. It is not entirely clear
whether one would like to characterize the joint publication of papers a real spill-over e¤ect.
I therefore investigate whether authors who lose a coauthor also publish less if one focuses on
the publications which were not coauthored with the dismissed coauthor. Finding a drop in
these publications after the dismissal would suggest classic spill-over e¤ects between coauthors.
Indeed, I nd a negative and signicant e¤ect from losing a high quality coauthor even on those
publications. These results suggest that peer e¤ects are important among coauthors.
There is of course a worry that the dismissals a¤ected the productivity of scientists through
other channels. I discuss these threats to the identication strategy below and show evidence
that the dismissals are uncorrelated with changing incentives in the a¤ected departments, and
the number of ardent Nazi supporters in the department. I also investigate whether di¤erent
funding patterns might explain my results. The fact that my results are very similar for
theoretical physicists and mathematicians, where laboratories are not important, suggests that
counterbalancing funding is not likely to contaminate my estimates. Furthermore, I show
that di¤erent productivity trends of a¤ected and una¤ected departments do not seem to be
important in this setup.
Understanding the e¤ects of the dismissal of a large number of scientists during the Nazi
period is interesting in its own right. Recently other economists have analyzed aspects of the
Nazi rise to power. Ferguson and Voth (2008), for example, show that rms supporting the
Nazi movement experienced unusually high stock-market returns in the rst months of the Nazi
regime. The ndings of my paper may also lead to a better understanding of similar events
which occurred in other countries. One example is the purge of thousands of scientists who
did not adhere to the communist ideology in the Soviet Union under Stalin. The scope of
this paper, however, goes beyond the understanding of historical events, because it allows the
identication of peer e¤ects using an exogenous variation in a researchers peer group. The
question remains whether evidence on peer e¤ects in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s can be
used to understand peer interactions today. A number of reasons suggest that the ndings
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of this study may be relevant for understanding spill-overs among present-day researchers.
The three subjects studied in this paper were already well established at that time; especially
in Germany. Scientic research followed practices and conventions which were very similar
to current research methods. Researchers were publishing their results in refereed academic
journals, conferences were common, and researchers were surprisingly mobile. Unlike today,
they could not communicate via E-mail. They did, however, vividly discuss research questions
in letters. Given the dramatic fall in communication and transportation costs it is quite likely
that localized peer interactions are even less important today than in the 1920s and 1930s.
The increased specialization in scientic research makes it harder to nd researchers working
on similar topics in the same department. This will further contribute to the fact that todays
localized peer e¤ects are less important than in the past.
As described before, I nd that peer e¤ects among coauthors are important. Reductions in
transportation and communication costs suggest that potential benets from collaborating with
researchers who are located in a di¤erent university may be even more important today. The
increased importance of teams in the production of scientic research and increased cooperation
between researchers from di¤erent universities and even countries may partly be driven by peer
e¤ects among coauthors.2 If lower communication costs are indeed facilitating the interaction of
coauthors across di¤erent departments my results would provide a lower bound for peer e¤ects
among coauthors today.
This study contributes to a growing literature on peer e¤ects among university researchers.
To my knowledge, it is the rst to analyze localized peer e¤ects among scientists using credibly
exogenous variation in peer quality. It is also the rst study to separate the e¤ects of the
number of a scientists peers and their average quality.
Azoulay, Wang, and Zivin (2007) investigate peer e¤ects among coauthors in the life sciences.
Using the death of a prolic researcher as an exogenous source of variation in a scientists peer
group they nd that deaths of coauthors lead to a decline in a researchers productivity. They
nd stronger e¤ects for more prolic coauthors. Their setup does not allow them, however, to
directly analyze localized peer e¤ects which are widely believed to be important. In my setup
I can observe the universe of all university researchers in physics, chemistry, and mathematics.
Azoulay et al. only observe the coauthors of dying researchers and not all peers in their
department or specialization. The fact that their results on coauthors are very similar to my
coauthor results in early 20th century Germany suggests that my ndings may indeed shed
light on peer e¤ects today. Oettl (2008) extends the analysis of Azoulay et al. and shows that
coauthor peer e¤ects are large not only if the dying coauthor was very productive but also when
he was considered very helpful by his surviving coauthors.
A recent study by Weinberg (2007) analyzes peer e¤ects among Nobel Prize winners in
physics. He nds evidence for mild peer e¤ects among physics Nobel laureates. Using the
2Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi (2007) show that the number of coauthors in science research increased dramatically
since 1955. Furthermore, Adams et al. (2005) show an increase in the geographic dispersion of research teams
in the US. Recently, Agrawal and Goldfarb (2008) have shown that falling communication costs have increased
collaborations of engineers across universities in the US.
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timing of starting Nobel Prize winning work he tries to establish causality. It is very likely,
however, that this does not fully address the endogeneity problem which may a¤ect his results
on spill-overs. Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2006) estimate peer e¤ects in economics and nance
faculties and nd positive peer e¤ects for the 1970s, and 1980s, but negative peer e¤ects for
the 1990s. They argue that their results are not contaminated by endogeneity problems. The
regression specically analyzing peer e¤ects, however, does not control for endogenous selection
of peers.34
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives a brief description
of historical details. A particular focus lies on the description of the quantitative and qualitative
loss to German science. Section 3 gives a more detailed description of the data sources used
in the analysis. Section 4 describes the identication strategy. The e¤ect of the dismissal on
the productivity of department level and specialization level peers remaining in Germany is
analyzed in section 5. Using the dismissal as an exogenous source of variation in peer quality
I then present instrumental variable results of localized peer e¤ects in section 6. Regressions
presented in Section 7 probe the robustness of these ndings. In section 8 I present evidence
on peer e¤ects among coauthors. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Expulsion of Jewish and Politically Unreliable
Scholars from German Universities
Just over two months after the National Socialist Party seized power in 1933 the Nazi govern-
ment implemented the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" on the 7th
of April of 1933. Despite this misleading name the law was used to expel all Jewish and "polit-
ically unreliable" persons from civil service in Germany. At that time most German university
professors were civil servants. Therefore the law was directly applicable to them. Via additional
ordinances the law was also applied to university employees who were not civil servants. Thus
the law a¤ected all researchers at the German universities. The main parts of the law read:
Paragraph 3: Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be placed in
retirement... (this) does not apply to o¢ cials who had already been in the service
since the 1st of August, 1914, or who had fought in the World War at the front for
3Another related strand of the literature focuses on regional spill-over e¤ects of patent citations. Ja¤e,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) use an ingenious method to control for pre-existing regional concentration
of patent citations. They nd that citations of patents are more geographically clustered than one would expect
if there were no regional spill-over e¤ects. Thompson and Fox-Keane (2005) challenge those ndings in a later
paper.
4In addition to papers analyzing peer e¤ects among university researchers there is a growing literature
examining peer e¤ects in other, mostly low skill, work environments. Mas and Moretti (2008) show that
grocery store cashiers increase their productivity when working alongside high productivity peers. Furthermore,
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007) show that the productivity of fruit pickers conforms to a common norm
set by their peers.
6
the German Reich or for its allies, or whose fathers or sons had been casualties in
the World War.
Paragraph 4: Civil servants who, based on their previous political activities,
cannot guarantee that they have always unreservedly supported the national state,
can be dismissed from service.
["Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service", quoted after Hentschel
(1996)]
In a further implementation decree it was specied that all members of the Communist
Party were to be expelled. The decree also specied "Aryan decent" as: "Anyone descended
from Non-Aryan, and in particular Jewish, parents or grandparents, is considered non-Aryan.
It is su¢ cient that one parent or one grandparent be non-Aryan." Thus scientists who were
Christians were dismissed if they had a least one Jewish grandparent. The law was immedi-
ately implemented and resulted in a wave of dismissals and early retirement from the German
universities. A careful early study by Harthorne published in 1937 counts 1111 dismissals from
the German universities and technical universities between 1933 and 1934.5 This amounts to
about 15 percent of the 7266 university researchers present at the beginning of 1933. Most
dismissals occurred in 1933 immediately after the law was implemented. Not everybody was
dismissed as soon as 1933 because the law allowed Jewish scholars to remain in o¢ ce if they
had been in o¢ ce since 1914, if they had fought in the First World War, or had lost a father or
son in the War. Nonetheless, many of the scholars who could stay according to this exception
decided to leave voluntarily; for example the Nobel laureates James Franck and Fritz Haber.
They were just anticipating a later dismissal as the Reich citizenship laws (Reichsbürgergesetz)
of 1935 revoked the exception clause.
Table 1 reports the number of dismissals in the three subjects studied in this paper: physics,
chemistry, and mathematics. Similarly to Harthorne, I focus my analysis on researchers who
had the Right to Teach (venia legendi) at a German university. According to my calculation
about 13.6 percent of the physicists who were present at the beginning of 1933 were dismissed
between 1933 and 1934.6 In chemistry and mathematics the loss was 13.1 and 18.3 percent,
respectively.7 It is interesting to note that the percentage of dismissals in these three subjects
and at the German universities overall was much higher than the fraction of Jews living in
Germany. It is estimated that about 0.7 percent of the total population in Germany was
Jewish at the beginning of 1933.
5The German university system had a number of di¤erent university types. The main ones were the tradi-
tional universities and the technical universities. The traditional universities usually covered the full spectrum
of subjects. The technical universities focused on technical subjects.
6This number is consistent with the number obtained by Fischer (1991) who reports that 15.5 percent of
physicists were dismissed between 1933 and 1940.
7Deichmann (2001) calculates a loss of about 24 percent from 1933 to 1939. The di¤erence between the two
gures can be explained by the fact that she includes all dismissals from 1933 to 1939. Furthermore my sample
includes 5 more universities which all have below average dismissals. Unfortunately there are no comparable
numbers for mathematics by other researchers.
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My data does not allow me to identify whether the researchers were dismissed because
they were Jewish or because of their political orientation. Other researchers, however, have
investigated this issue and have shown that the vast majority of the dismissed were either
Jewish or of Jewish decent. Deichmann (2001) studies chemists in German and Austrian
universities (after the German annexation of Austria in 1938 the Nazi government extended
the aforementioned laws to researchers at Austrian universities). She nds that about 87
percent of the dismissed chemists were Jewish or of Jewish decent. The remaining 13 percent
were dismissed for political reasons. Siegmund-Schultze (1998) estimates that about 79 percent
of the dismissed scholars in mathematics were Jewish.
Before giving further details on the distribution of dismissals across di¤erent universities I
am going to provide a brief overview over the fate of the dismissed researchers. Immediately
after the rst wave of dismissals in 1933 foreign émigré aid organizations were founded to assist
the dismissed scholars with obtaining positions in foreign universities. The rst organization
to be founded was the English "Academic Assistance Council" (later renamed into "Society
for the Protection of Science and Learning"). It was established as early as April 1933 by
the director of the London School of Economics Sir William Beveridge. In the US the "Emer-
gency Committee in Aid of Displaced Scholars" was founded in 1933. Another important aid
organization, founded in 1935 by some of the dismissed scholars themselves, was the Emer-
gency Alliance of German Scholars Abroad ("Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im
Ausland"). The main purpose of these and other, albeit smaller, organizations were to assist
the dismissed scholars in nding positions abroad. In addition to that prominent individuals
like Eugen Wigner, Albert Einstein or Hermann Weyl tried to use their extensive network of
personal contacts to nd employment for less well-known scientists. Due to the very high inter-
national reputation of German physicists, chemists, and mathematicians many of them could
nd positions without the help of the aid organizations. Less renowned and older scientists
had more problems in nding adequate positions abroad. Initially many dismissed scholars ed
to European countries. Many of these countries were only temporary refuges because the dis-
missed researchers often obtained temporary positions, only. The expanding territory of Nazi
Germany in the early stages of World War II led to a second wave of emigration from the coun-
tries which were invaded by the German army. The main destinations of dismissed physicists,
chemists, and mathematicians were the United States, England, Turkey, and Palestine. The
biggest proportion of dismissed scholars in all three subjects eventually moved to the United
States. For the purposes of this paper it is important to note that the vast majority of the
emigrations took place immediately after the researchers were dismissed from their university
positions. Further collaborations with researchers staying in Germany were thus extremely dif-
cult and did hardly occur. A minority of the dismissed, however, did not leave Germany and
most of them died in concentration camps or committed suicide. Very few, managed to stay
in Germany and survive the Nazi regime. Even these scientists who stayed in Germany were
no longer allowed to use university laboratories and other resources. The possibility of ongoing
collaboration of the dismissed scientists with researchers staying at the German universities
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was thus extremely limited.
The aggregate numbers of dismissals hides the fact that the German universities were af-
fected very di¤erently by the dismissals. Even within a university there was a lot of variation
across di¤erent departments. Whereas some departments did not experience any dismissals
others lost more than 50 percent of their personnel. The vast majority of dismissals occurred
in 1933 and 1934. Only a small number of scientists was dismissed after these years. The few
dismissals occurring after 1933 a¤ected researchers who had been exempted under the clause
for war veterans or for having obtained their position before 1914. In addition to that, some
political dismissals occurred during the later years. In order to have a sharp dismissal measure
I focus on the dismissals in 1933 and 1934. Table 2 reports the number of dismissals in the
di¤erent universities and departments. An example for the huge variation in dismissals is the
university of Göttingen, one of the leading universities at the time. It lost 40 percent of its
researchers in physics and almost 60 percent in mathematics. In chemistry, however, not a
single scholar was dismissed from the department between 1933 to 1934.
Table 3 gives a more detailed picture of the quantitative and qualitative loss in the three
subjects. The dismissed physicists were younger than the average but made above average
scientic contributions; they received more Nobel Prizes (either before or after the dismissal),
published more papers in top journals, and received more citations for their publications.8 The
scientic excellence of the dismissed physicists has already been noticed by Fischer (1991). In
chemistry the dismissed were more similar to those who stayed in Germany. The dismissed
mathematicians were of even higher excellence compared to the average researchers than the
physicists.
About 33 percent of the publications in top journals were co-written papers in physics.
About 11 percent of all papers were co-published with a coauthor holding a faculty position at
a German university. This fraction is much lower than the overall level of co-publishing because
of two reasons. A large fraction of coauthors were assistants or Ph.D. students. Secondly, some
coauthors were teaching at a foreign university or were employed by a research institute. The
last line of Table 3 shows the low level of cooperation within a department; only about 4
percent of all publications were coauthored with a member of sta¤ from the same university. In
chemistry 76 percent of papers were coauthored, 12 percent were coauthored with a coauthor
holding a faculty position at a German university and only 5 percent of publications were
coauthored with a faculty member from the same university. In mathematics these numbers
were 11 percent, 6 percent, and 3 percent, respectively.
8For a more detailed description of the publications data see the Data section.
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3 Data
3.1 Data on Dismissed Scholars
The data on dismissed scholars is obtained from a number of di¤erent sources. The main source
is the "List of Displaced German Scholars". This list was compiled by the relief organization
"Emergency Alliance of German Scholars Abroad". With the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation
it was published in 1936. The list should facilitate the nding of positions for the dismissed
researchers in countries outside Germany. Overall, the list contained about 1650 names of
researchers from all university subjects. In the introductory part of the list the editors explain
that they have made the list as complete as possible. Most historians of science working on the
dismissal of researchers in Nazi Germany have used this list as the basis for their research. I
extracted all dismissed physicists, chemists, and mathematicians from the list. In the appendix
I show a sample page from the physics section of the list. Interestingly, four physicists who
had already received the Nobel Prize or were to receive it in later years appear on that page.
Out of various reasons, for example if the dismissed died before the List of Displaced German
Scholars" was compiled, a small number of dismissed scholars did not appear in the list. To get
a more precise measure of all dismissals I complement the information in the "List of Displaced
German Scholars" with information from other sources.9
The main additional source is the "Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigra-
tion nach 1933 - Vol. II : The arts, sciences, and literature". The compilation of the handbook
was initiated by the "Institut für Zeitgeschichte München" and the "Research Foundation for
Jewish Immigration New York". Published in 1983 it contained short biographies of artists and
university researchers who emigrated from Nazi Germany. Kröner (1983) extracted a list of all
dismissed university researchers from the handbook. I use Kröners list to append my list of
all dismissed scholars.
In addition to these two main data sources I rely on data compiled by historians who
studied individual academic subjects during the Nazi era. Beyerchen (1977) included a list
of dismissed physicists in his book about the physics community in Nazi Germany. I use the
information included in that list to amend my list of dismissed scholars. Furthermore, I use
data from an extensive list of dismissed chemists which was compiled by Deichmann (2001).
Similarly, I complement my list with the information listed in Siegmund-Schultzes (1998) book
on dismissed mathematicians.
It is important to note that my list of dismissals also contains the few researchers who
were initially exempted from being dismissed but resigned voluntarily. The vast majority of
them would have been dismissed due to the racial laws of 1935 anyway and were thus only
anticipating their dismissal. All of these voluntary resignations were directly caused by the
discriminatory policies of the Nazi regime.
9Slightly less than 20 percent of 1933 to 1934 dismissals do only appear in those additional sources.
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3.2 Data on all Scientists at German Universities between 1925 and
1938
To investigate the impact of the dismissals on the researchers who stayed at the German univer-
sities I construct a full list of all scientists at the German universities from 1925 to 1938. Using
the semi-o¢ cial University Calendar10 I compile an annual roster of the universe of physicists,
chemists, and mathematicians from the winter semester 1924/1925 (lasting from November
1924 until April 1925) until the winter semester 1937/1938. The data for the technical univer-
sities starts in 1927/1928, because the University Calendar included the technical universities
only after that date. The University Calendar is a compilation of all individual university
calenders listing the lectures held by each scholar in a given department. If a researcher was
not lecturing in a given semester he was still listed under the heading "not lecturing". From
this list of lectures I infer the subject of each researcher to construct yearly faculty lists of all
physics, chemistry, and mathematics departments.11 ;12
To assess a researchers specialization I consult seven volumes of "Kürschners deutscher
Gelehrten-Kalender". These books are listings of German researchers compiled at irregular
intervals since 1925.13 The editors of the book obtained their data by sending out question-
naires to researchers asking them to provide information on their scientic career. I use this
information to ascertain a scientists specialization. Because of the blurred boundaries of the
specializations in mathematics a lot of mathematicians did not specify their specialization. In
those cases I infer the specialization from the main publications they list in the "Gelehrtenkalen-
der". As the participation of the researchers in the compilation was voluntary not all of them
provided their personal information to the editor. If I cannot nd a scientists specialization in
any of the volumes of the "Gelehrtenkalender", which occurs for about 10 percent of scientists,
I conduct an internet-search for the scientist to obtain his specialization. Overall I obtain the
10The University Calender was published by J.A. Barth. He collected the o¢ cial university calenders from all
German universities and compiled them into one volume. Originally named "Deutscher Universitätskalender".
It was renamed "Kalender der deutschen Universitäten und technischen Hochschulen" in 1927/1928. From
1929/1930 it was renamed "Kalender der Deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen". In 1933 it was again
renamed into "Kalender der reichsdeutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen".
11At that time a researcher could hold a number of di¤erent university positions. Ordinary Professors held a
chair for a certain subeld and were all civil servants. Furthermore there were di¤erent types of Extraordinary
Professors. First, they could be either civil servants (beamteter Extraordinarus) or not have the status of a civil
servant (nichtbeamteter Extraordinarius). Universities also distinguished between extraordinary extraordinary
professors (ausserplanmäßiger Extraordinarus) and planned extraordinary professors (planmäßiger Extraordi-
narius). Then as the lowest level of university teachers there were the Privatdozenten who were never civil
servants. Privatdozent is the rst university position a researcher could obtain after the venia legendi.
12The dismissed researchers who were not civil servants (Privatdozenten and some Extraordinary Professors)
all disappear from the University Calendar between the winter semester 1932/1933 to the winter semester
1933/1934. Some of the dismissed researchers who were civil servants (Ordinary Professors and some Extra-
ordinary Professors), however, were still listed even after they were dismissed. The original law forced Jewish
civil servants into early retirement. As they were still on the statespayroll some universities still listed them
in the University Calendar even though they were not allowed to teach or do research anymore. My list of
dismissals includes the exact year after which somebody was barred from teaching and researching at a German
university. I thus use the dismissal data to determine the actual dismissal date and not the date a dismissed
scholar disappears from the University Calendars.
13The rst volume was compiled in 1925. The other volumes I have used were published for the years 1926,
1928/29, 1931, 1935, 1940/41, and 1950.
11
scientists specialization for about 98 percent of all researchers.14 Table A1 in the appendix
gives an overview of all specializations and the fraction of scientists in each of them.
3.3 Publication Data
To measure a researchers productivity I construct a dataset containing the publications of each
researcher in the top academic journals of the time. At that time most German researchers
published in German journals. The quality of these German journals was usually very high
because many of the German physicists, chemists, and mathematicians were among the leaders
in their eld. This is especially true for the time before the dismissal as is exemplied by the
following quote; "Before the advent of the Nazis the German physics journals (Zeitschrift für
Physik, Annalen der Physik, Physikalische Zeitschrift) had always served as the central organs
of world science in this domain [...] In 1930 approximately 700 scientic papers were printed
in its (the Zeitschrift für Physik´s) seven volumes of which 280 were by foreign scientists."
(American Association for the Advancement of Science (1941)). Simonsohn (2007) shows that
neither the volume nor the content of the "Zeitschrift für Physik" changed dramatically in the
post dismissal years until 1938. Not surprisingly, however, he nds that the dismissed physicists
published less and less in the German journals after the dismissal. It is important to note, that
the identication strategy outlined below relies on changes in publications of researchers in
di¤erent German departments which were di¤erentially a¤ected by the dismissal. A decline in
the quality of the considered journals would therefore not a¤ect my results as all regressions
are estimated including year xed e¤ects.
The list of top publications is based on all German speaking general science, physics, chem-
istry, and mathematics journals which are included in the "ISI Web of Science" for the time
period 1915 to 1940. Furthermore, I add the leading general journals which were not published
in Germany, namely Nature, Science, and the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London to
the dataset. I also include four non-German top specialized journals which were suggested by
historians of science as journals of some importance for the German scientic community.15
The "Web of Science" is an electronic database provided by Thomson Scientic containing all
contributions in a very large number of science journals. In 2004 the database was extended
to include publications between 1900 and 1945. The journals included in that extension were
all journals which had published the most relevant articles in the years 1900 to 1945.16 This
process insures that all publications which can be obtained for the early time period 1900 to
1945 were published in the most important journals.
14Some researchers cite more than one specialization. Therefore, physicists and chemists have up to two
specializations and mathematicians up to four.
15The relevant journals for chemists were suggested by Ute Deichmann and John Andraos who both work
on chemistry in the early 20th century. Additional journals for mathematics were suggested by Reinhard
Siegmund-Schultze and David Wilkins; both are specialists in the history of mathematics.
16For that extension Thomson Scientic judged the importance of a journal by later citatons (cited between
1945 and 2004) in the Web of Science of articles published between 1900 and 1945. For more details on the
process see www.thomsonscientic.com/media/presentrep/facts/centuryofscience.pdf.
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Table 4 lists all journals used in my analysis. For each of these journals I obtain all articles
published between 1925 and 1940 from the "ISI Web of Science". A very small number of the
contributions in the top journals were letters to the editor or comments. I restrict my analysis
to contributions classied as "articles" as they provide a cleaner measure for a researchers
productivity. The database includes the names of the authors of each article and statistics on
the number of subsequent citations of each of these articles. For each researcher I then calculate
di¤erent yearly productivity measures. The rst measure is equal to the sum of publications
in top journals in a given year. In order to quantify an articles quality I construct a second
measure which accounts for the number of times the article was cited in any journal included
in the Web of Science in the rst 50 years after its publication. This includes citations in
journals which are not in my list of journals but which appear in the Web of Science. The
measure includes citations from the international scientic community. It is therefore less
heavily based on German science. I call this measure citation weighted publications and it is
dened as the sum of citations (in the rst 50 years after publication) of all articles published
in a certain year. The following simple example illustrates the construction of the citation
weighted publications measure. Suppose a researcher published two top journal articles in
1932. One is cited 5 times the other 7 times in any journal covered by the Web of Science in
the 50 years after its publication. The researchers citation weighed publications measure for
1932 is then 5+7=12. Furthermore, I construct normalized (citation weighted) publications by
normalizing the aforementioned measures with the number of coauthors.
Table A2 lists the top researchers for each subject according to the citation weighted pub-
lications measure. The researchers in this table are the 20 researchers with the highest yearly
averages of citation weighted publications for publications between 1925 and 1932. It is reassur-
ing to realize that the vast majority of these top 20 researchers are well known in the scientic
community. Economists will nd it interesting that Johann von Neumann is the most cited
mathematician. The large number of Nobel laureates among the top 20 researchers indicates
that citation weighted publications are a good measure of a scholars productivity. Neverthe-
less, the measure is not perfect. As the "Web of Science" only reports last names and the initial
of the rst name for each author there are some cases where I cannot unambiguously match
researchers and publications. In these cases I assign the publication to the researcher whose
eld is most closely related to the eld of the journal in which the article was published. In the
very few cases where this assignment rule is still ambiguous between two researchers I assign
each researcher half of the (citation weighted) publications. Another problem is the relatively
large number of misspellings of authorsnames. All articles published between 1925 and 1940
were of course published on paper. In order to include these articles into the electronic database
Thomson Scientic employees scanned all articles published in the historically most relevant
journals. The scanning was error prone and thus lead to misspellings of some names. As far as
I discovered these misspellings I manually corrected them.
I merged the publications data to the roster of all German physicists, chemists, and mathe-
maticians. From the list of dismissed scholars I can identify the researchers who were dismissed
13
and those who stayed at the German universities. The end result is a panel dataset of the
universe of physicists, chemists, and mathematicians at all German universities from 1925 until
1938 with detailed information on their publications in the top academic journals and their
dismissal status.
4 Identication
Using this panel dataset I estimate peer e¤ects among scientists. The standard approach
when estimating peer e¤ects consists of regressing an individuals productivity on the average
productivity of his peers. The productivity of academic researchers, however, is not only a¤ected
by the average quality of their peers but also by the number of peers they can interact with.
Having smart colleagues may be useful in many ways: coauthored work may be of higher quality
and comments from prolic peers may be useful for their own work. Furthermore, peers may
attract more research funding to the department, or have better contacts to researchers outside
the department. Having more colleagues in your department may be important because all these
interactions are more likely to occur if there are more peers to interact with, especially because
it may be easier to nd colleagues who are working on similar research questions. Researchers
in larger departments may also benet from a lower teaching load and from teaching more
specialized courses which are more related to their current research.
As university departments di¤er substantially in the average quality of its researchers and
also in size, it is important to distinguish these two dimensions of peer e¤ects for academic
research. In order to estimate peer e¤ects among scientists I therefore propose the following
regression:
(1) # Publicationsiut = 1 + 2(# of Peers)ut + 3(Avg. Peer Quality)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
I regress the number of publications of researcher i in university u and year t on measures of
the peer group and other controls. In order to control for the quality of a published article I use
citation weighted publications as an alternative dependent variable. I estimate these regressions
separately for physics, chemistry, and mathematics because the subjects in consideration have
di¤erent publication and collaboration patterns. The peer group measures are a researchers
number of peers and the average quality of these peers. Average peer quality is calculated as the
mean of the average productivity of a researchers peers.1718 Over time changes in the average
peer quality measure will only occur if the composition of the department changes. Yearly
17Say a department has 3 researchers in 1930. One published on average 10 (citation weighted) publications
between 1925 and 1938. The other two have 20 and 15 citation weighted publications respectively. Then the
average peer quality variable for researcher 1 in 1930 will be (20+15)/2 = 17.5. Average peer quality for
researcher 2 will be (10+15)/2 = 12.5 and so on.
18I use the department mean of average productivity between 1925 and 1938. An alternative way of calculating
the average peer productivity uses only the pre-dismissal years 1925 to 1932. This measure is, however, not
dened for researchers who join after 1933. I therefore present the results using the rst measure. Using the
alternative measure does not a¤ect my ndings.
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uctuations in publications of the same set of peers will not a¤ect the peer group measure. The
underlying assumption is therefore that Albert Einstein always has the same e¤ect on his peers
independent of how much he publishes in a given year.
It is quite likely that the e¤ect of peers is only measurable after a certain time lag. Peers
inuence the creation of new ideas and papers before the actual date of publication. Another
delay is caused by the publication lag (the time it takes for a paper to appear in a journal
after the paper was submitted by the author). Science research, however, is published faster
than research in other subjects like economics. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the e¤ect
of peers should be measured with a lag of about one year. An illustrative example of the
timing of peer interactions in science research at the relevant time is the postulation of the
"uncertainty principle" by Heisenberg in 1927. In 1926 Heisenberg was working with Niels
Bohr in Copenhagen. It is reported that during that time Heisenberg and Bohr spent days
and nights discussing the concepts of quantum mechanics in order to rene them. Early in
1927, Niels Bohr went on a holiday and it was during that time that Heisenberg discovered and
formulated his famous "uncertainty principle". He published this discovery in the "Zeitschrift
für Physik" in 1927.19 Therefore I use a lag of one year for the peer group variables when
estimating equation (1).20
As further controls I include a full set of 5-year age group dummies to control for life-
cycle changes in productivity when estimating equation (1).21 Furthermore, I control for yearly
uctuations in publications which a¤ect all researchers by including year xed e¤ects. To
control for individual di¤erences in a researchers talent I also add individual xed e¤ects to
all specications. Furthermore, I add university xed e¤ects to control for university specic
factors a¤ecting a researchers productivity. These can be separately identied because some
scientists change universities. I show below that the results are hardly a¤ected by including
university xed e¤ects in addition to individual xed e¤ects.
Estimating equation (1) using OLS will lead to a number of problems. One problem is
caused by the fact that a researchers productivity is a¤ected by his peers but at the same time
the researcher a¤ects the productivity of his peers. Manski (1993) refers to this problem as the
reection problem. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the estimated e¤ects will be
total e¤ects after all productivity adjustments have taken place.
Other problems, however, are potentially more severe in this context. An important prob-
lem is caused by selection e¤ects. These occur not only because of self selection of researchers
into departments with peers of similar quality but also because departments appoint professors
of similar productivity. Furthermore, larger departments tend to hire researchers with above
average qualities. The inclusion of university xed e¤ects would in principle address this prob-
lem. Di¤erential time trends of di¤erent departments, however, would make selection issues an
important problem even in models which include university xed e¤ects. These selection e¤ects
introduce a correlation of the peer group measures with the error term and will thus bias the
19For a detailed historic description of the discovery of the uncertainty principle see Lindley (2007).
20Using di¤erent lags does not a¤ect the results.
21Levin and Stephan (1991) show that age is an important determinant of scientistsproductivity.
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estimates of 2 and 3.
Another problem may be caused by omitted variables, such as the construction of a new
laboratory which may not be observed by the econometrician. Omitted factors may not only
a¤ect a researchers productivity but also the size of the department or the average productivity
of his peers at the same time. Not controlling for unobserved factors would introduce another
bias.
Furthermore, measurement error could bias the estimates of regression (1). An important
measurement problem is the actual peer group of a researcher. In addition to that, even good
measures of peer quality, such as the average number of citation weighted publications, are
by no means perfect. Even if one were to believe that such measures could perfectly quantify
peer quality, misspellings of names in the publication data would introduce measurement error.
These measurement problems will introduce further biases of 2 and 3.
An instrumental variables strategy can deal with selection, omitted variables bias, and
measurement error. I therefore propose the dismissal of scholars by the Nazi government as an
instrument for the scientistspeer group. Figure 1 shows the e¤ect of the dismissal on the peer
group of physicists.
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Figure 1: First Stages Physics
The top panel shows the average department size for two groups of physicists: physicists in
departments with dismissals in 1933 or 1934 and physicists in departments without dismissals.
Figure 1 shows that the a¤ected departments were of above average size. The size of depart-
ments without dismissals did hardly change over this time period. In the a¤ected departments
the dismissal led to a strong reduction in the number of physicists which persisted until the
end of the sample period. The dismissed were not immediately replaced because of a lack of
suitable researchers without a position and the slow appointment procedures. Successors for
dismissed chaired professors, for example, could only be appointed if the dismissed scholars gave
up all their pension rights because the dismissed professors were originally placed into early
retirement. The states did not want to pay the salary for the replacement and the pension
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for the dismissed professor at the same time. It thus took years to ll open positions in most
cases. Highlighting this problem, Max Wien a physicist in Jena, wrote a letter to Bernhard
Rust the Minister of Education in late November 1934. Describing the situation for chaired
professorships at the German universities he stated in his letter that "out of the 100 existing
[chaired professor] teaching positions, 17 are not lled at present, while under natural retire-
ments maybe two or three would be vacant. This state of a¤airs gives cause for the gravest
concern..." (cited after Hentschel, 1996).
The second panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of average peer quality in the two types of
departments. Obviously, one would expect a change in average peer quality only if the quality
of the dismissed was either above or below the pre-dismissal department average. The bottom
panel of Figure 1 demonstrates two interesting points: the dismissals occurred at departments
of above average quality and within those departments the dismissed were on average more
productive than the physicists who were not dismissed. As a result the average quality of peers
in a¤ected departments fell after 1933. The graph only shows averages for the two groups of
departments. As can be seen from Table 2 some departments with dismissals also lost below
average peers. Average department quality increased in those departments. Overall, however,
the dismissal reduced average department quality in physics.
Figure 2 explores the e¤ect of the dismissal on the peer group of chemists. Like in physics
most of the dismissals occurred in larger departments and had a strong e¤ect on department
size. The a¤ected departments were of above average quality, as well, but the di¤erence was
less pronounced than in physics. As suggested by the summary statistics presented before, the
dismissal had a smaller overall e¤ect on average quality. Despite the fact that the dismissal did
not have a large e¤ect on peer quality for the average across all departments it strongly a¤ected
average quality in many departments as can be seen from Table 2. The e¤ects in departments
with reductions in peer quality and in departments with improvements in peer quality, however,
almost cancel out in the aggregate.
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Figure 2: First Stages Chemistry
Figure 3 investigates the e¤ect of the dismissals on the peer group of mathematicians.
Similarly to physics and chemistry the a¤ected departments were larger before the dismissal.
After 1933 department size fell sharply in the a¤ected universities. The mathematicians in the
a¤ected departments were of above average quality before the dismissal. Due to that average
peer quality fell drastically in departments with dismissals.
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Figure 3: First Stages Mathematics
Figures 1 to 3 suggest that the dismissal had a strong e¤ect on the number of peers and
their average quality. It is therefore possible to use the dismissal as an instrument for the
endogenous peer group variables. As mentioned before, there are two endogenous variables in
this setting: the number of peers and their average quality. This gives rise to two rst stage
equations:
(2) # of Peersut = 1 + 2(# Dismissed)ut + 3(Dismissal induced Reduction in Peer Quality)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
(3) Avg. Peer Qualityut = 1 + 2(# Dismissed)ut + 3(Dismissal induced Reduction in Peer Quality)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
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It is important to note that all regressions estimated in this paper are estimated for scientists
who were present at the beginning of 1933 and were not dismissed (the so called stayers). The
dismissal is then used as a source of exogenous variation in their peer group. Equation (2)
is the rst stage regression for department size. The main instrument for department size is
the number of dismissed peers between 1933 and 1934 in a given department which is 0 until
1933 and equal to the number of dismissals thereafter.22 I also include another instrument
which captures the dismissal induced reduction in average quality of peers. This will be more
important for equation (3), the rst stage equation for average peer quality. The dismissal
induced reduction in average peer quality is measured as the pre-dismissal average quality of
all researchers in the department minus the average quality of the researchers who were not
dismissed. The variable is 0 until 1933 in all departments. Researchers in departments with
dismissals of colleagues of above average quality (relative to the department average) have
a positive value of the dismissal induced reduction in peer quality variable after 1933. The
variable will remain 0 for researchers who did not experience any dismissal in their department
or for scientists who lost peers whose quality was below the department level average. The
implicit assumption is therefore that below average dismissals did not a¤ect the productivity of
scientists. An alternative way of dening "dismissal induced reduction in peer quality" would
be to allow the dismissal of below average peers to have a positive impact on the productivity of
scientists. In specications not reported in this paper I have explored this. The results do not
change.23 The dismissals between 1933 and 1934 may have caused some researchers to switch
university after 1933. This switching behavior, however, will be endogenous and thus have a
direct e¤ect on researchersproductivity. To circumvent this problem I assign each scientist
the relevant dismissal variables for the department he attended at the beginning of 1933.
The e¤ect of the dismissal is likely to be correlated for all stayers in a department. I
therefore account for any dependence between observations within a department by clustering
all results at the department level. This not only allows the error to be arbitrarily correlated for
all researchers in one department at a given point in time but it also allows for serial correlation
of these error terms.
Using the dismissal as an instrumental variable relies on the assumption that the dismissal
had no other e¤ect on a researchers productivity than through its e¤ect on the researchers peer
group. It is important to note that any factor a¤ecting all researchers in Germany in a similar
way, such a possible decline of journal quality, will be captured by the year xed e¤ects and
would thus not invalidate the identication strategy. As the una¤ected departments act as a
control group, only factors changing at the same time as the dismissal and exclusively a¤ecting
22This variable is 0 until 1933 for all departments (As I use a one year lag in the peer group variables it is
0 for 1933 inclusive). In 1934 it is equal to the number of researchers who were dismissed in 1933 in a given
department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 and 1934. The following example
illustrates this. In Göttingen there were 10 dismissals in mathematics in 1933 and one dismissal in 1934. The
# dismissed variable for mathematicians in Göttingen will therefore take the value 0 until 1933. It will be 10
in 1934 and 11 from 1935 onwards.
23Not surprisingly, the rst stage becomes stronger if one allows dismissals of below average quality to pos-
itively a¤ect average department quality, as department quality (the endogenous variable) is always computed
including all researchers. I report the results for the more conservative measure in the paper.
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the departments with dismissals (or only at those without dismissals) may be potential threats
to my identication strategy.
One may worry that the dismissals changed the incentive structure for stayers in the a¤ected
departments. Researchers in departments or specializations with many dismissals may have an
incentive to work more to obtain one of the free chairs within the department. Their incentives
could also be a¤ected in the opposite direction if they lost an important advocate who was
fostering their career. In this case they may decide to work less as the chances of obtaining a
chair either in their own department or at another university could be lower. In order to address
this concern I estimate a regression which regresses a dummy variable of ever being promoted
on the dismissal variables and the same controls as in the regressions proposed before.24 The
results from this regression are presented in Table A3. The coe¢ cients on the dismissal variables
are all very small and none of them is signicantly di¤erent from 0. This suggests that the
results of this paper are probably not contaminated by changes in the incentive structures in
the a¤ected departments.
Another worry is that departments with more ardent Nazi supporters would increase their
productivity because they received more research funding or by receiving other priviledges.
This would threaten the identication strategy if the number of Nazi supporters was correlated
with the number of dismissals. Looking at the number of party members to investigate this
issue would not be very helpful because most university researchers eventually joined the Nazi
party. In November 1933, however, 839 university professors (out of more than 10,000 professors
in Germany) signed the "Commitment of Professors at the German Universities (...) to Adolf
Hitler and the National Socialist State..." This list should signal the professorssupport of the
new Nazi government and was widely publicized. Most people signing the list were probably
strong supporters of the Nazi regime and would therefore have beneted from any di¤erential
treatment. To test this hypothesis I regress a dummy for signing the support list on the dismissal
variables and other controls. The results are reported in Table A4. The coe¢ cients on the
dismissal variables are all small and none of them is signicantly di¤erent from 0, indicating
that strong support of the Nazi party was not di¤erent in departments with dismissals.25
Another worry is that scientists in departments with many dismissals took over laboratories
from the dismissed and thus increased their productivity. I show below that the results are
very similar for mathematicians and theoretical physicists. This is reassuring because the two
groups of scientists usually carry out their research outside the laboratory.
The identication strategy may also be invalidated if the Nazi government did increase the
funding of a¤ected departments in order to counterbalance possible negative dismissal e¤ects.
24The estimated regression is:
(Ever Promoted)iut = 1 + 2(# Dismissed)ut + 3(Dismissal induced # in Peer Quality)ut + 4Age
Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
25As there is no time variation in the dependent variable I estimate the regression including all scientists who
were present in November 1933. The estimated regression is:
(Signed Support List)iu = 1 + 2(# Dismissed)u + 3(Dismissal induced # in Peer Quality)u + 4Age
Dummiesiu + 5UniversityFEu + "iu
Alternatively, one could estimate this regression without University FEs. This does not change the results.
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Salaries for university employees were paid by the states and were closely linked to the position
or the researcher. They did not change dramatically over the time period and not di¤erentially
across di¤erent departments. Scientists could also apply for funding of individual research
projects. The main provider of research grants in the 1920s and 1930s was the "Emergency As-
sociation of German Science" (Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft) which was jointly
funded by the state and donations from companies.26 The grants were approved by a panel of
specialists based on the quality of the grant proposal and covered costs of experiments, such as
materials or expensive equipment. Unfortunately, there is no readily available consistent yearly
data on supported scientists. Nonetheless, I mange to obtain comparable data on scientists
who received funding for two years: the academic year 1928/1929 before the dismissal and for
1937/1938 after the dismissal. The data is relatively coarse as the reports only state whether a
scientist received funding from the Notgemeinschaft but not how much he received. To check
whether funding patterns changed after the dismissal, I regress an indicator of receiving funding
on the dismissal variables on a sample of stayers in the two years.27 The results are reported
in Table A5. All but one of the coe¢ cients are very small and not signicantly di¤erent from
0 indicating that changes in funding are not related to the dismissal. The coe¢ cient on the
reduction in peer quality for physics at the department level is negative, indicating that stayers
in departments with high quality dismissals received less funding after the dismissal. There is
therefore no worry that compensatory funding can explain my results. Any bias due to chang-
ing funding patterns would go against my nding that department level peer e¤ects in physics
are not important.
A further worry are general disruption e¤ects at the a¤ected departments. I show below that
my results are unchanged if I exclude the turbulent years 1933 and 1934 from the regressions.
These disruption e¤ects could, however, have persisted even after 1934 given that the dismissed
could not be rapidly replaced. Scientists in a¤ected departments might have had to take over
more administrative or teaching responsibilities. These e¤ects would most probably lead to
an upward bias of the instrumental variable results. The fact that I do not nd evidence for
peer e¤ects neither at the department level nor at the specialization level, however, reduces the
worry that this problem a¤ects the ndings of this paper.
Lastly any di¤erence-in-di¤erences type strategy relies on the assumption that treatment
and control groups did not follow di¤erential trends. I address this concern in two ways. First,
I show that the results presented below are not a¤ected by including linear university specic
time trends in the regressions. This approach would not address the problem if di¤erential
trends were nonlinear. I therefore estimate a so-called placebo experiment only using the pre-
dismissal period. I then estimate the same model but I move the dismissal from 1933 to 1930.
The results are reported in Table A6 and indicate that departments with dismissals do have
26The Notgemeinschaft was renamed in "Deutsche Gemeinschaft zur Erhaltung und Förderrung der
Forschung" in 1937 and is still the main funding source for individual researchers in Germany under the name
"Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft".
27I regress the following regression for one pre-dismissal and one post-dismissal year:
(Received Notgemeinschaft Funding)iut = 1+2(#Dismissed)ut + 3(Dismissal induced # in Peer Quality)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5UniversityFEut + "iut.
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di¤erent productivity trends compared to the una¤ected departments. Overall, I believe that
the dismissal provides a valid instrument to estimate peer e¤ects.
5 E¤ect of Dismissal on Scientists remaining in Germany
5.1 Department Level Dismissal E¤ect
There is no doubt that the dismissal of Jewish and "politically unreliable" scholars had a nega-
tive impact on the German universities. In this context it is especially interesting to investigate
how the dismissal a¤ected the researchers who stayed at the German universities. Did their
research productivity su¤er because they had fewer and less productive peers? The following
gures try to give a graphical answer to this question. Figure 4 plots the publications for
stayers in two sets of physics departments: those with dismissals and those without dismissals.
The yearly uctuation in top journal publications is relatively large. Despite this uctuation,
the gure suggests that the dismissal did not have an obvious e¤ect on the publications of the
stayers.
Figure 4: Reduced Form Physics
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the stayerspublications in chemistry departments. The
gure suggests no e¤ect of the dismissal on the stayersproductivity in chemistry.
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Figure 5: Reduced Form Chemistry
Figure 6 plots the top journal publications of mathematicians. Similarly to the other two
subjects the dismissal does not seem to have a pronounced e¤ect on the publications of the
stayers.
Figure 6: Reduced Form Mathematics
Figures 4 to 6 suggest no e¤ect of the dismissal on the publications of stayers in the a¤ected
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departments. In order to verify this nding and to quantify the e¤ect of the dismissal on the
stayers I estimate the following reduced form equation.
(4) # Publicationsiut = 1 + 2(# Dismissed)ut + 3(Dismissal induced Reduction in Peer Quality)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
Using only stayers below 70 years of age, I regress the researchers(citation weighted) nor-
malized publications in each year on the instruments proposed above. Researchers in depart-
ments which were not a¤ected will have a value of 0 for the dismissal variables.28 Researchers
in departments with dismissals will have 0 until 1933 and then the relevant value for the de-
partment to which they were a¢ liated at the beginning of 1933. This regression is essentially a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the dismissal e¤ect. It compares the change in publications
from the pre to the post dismissal period for researchers in the a¤ected departments to the
change between the two periods for una¤ected researchers.
Table 5 reports the reduced form results using the peers in a researchers department as the
relevant peer group. If the dismissal had a negative e¤ect on the number of publications one
would expect negative coe¢ cients on the dismissal variables. Both the coe¢ cient on the number
of dismissed researchers and the one on the dismissal induced reduction in peer quality are very
close to 0 and not signicant in any of the specications. Not surprisingly the coe¢ cients in
specications with citation weighted publications as the dependent variable are larger because
the mean of citation weighted publications is much larger than the one for publications. The
coe¢ cient on the reduction in peer quality even has the wrongsign in most specications if one
assumes that losing high quality peers should negatively a¤ect a researchers productivity. The
results indicate that the dismissal did not a¤ect the productivity of the stayers. These results are
a rst indication that peers, measured at the department level, may not a¤ect the productivity
of scientists. As departments are comprised of scientists with di¤erent specializations I want
to investigate whether the dismissal had an e¤ect on the stayers productivity if one considers
a narrower peer group denition. These results are reported in the next subsection.
5.2 Specialization Level Dismissal E¤ect
If a scientist mostly benets from interactions with peers in his specialization within the depart-
ment the specialization level peer group could be more relevant. The idea is that theoretical
physicists mostly interact with other theoretical physicists in the department and less with
experimental physicists. I therefore explore the dismissal e¤ect using only the peers from a
researchers own specialization.29 The regression is the same as regression (4) but instead of
28I focus on stayers below 70 which was the usual age of retirement for university professors in the early years
of my sample period. Older scientists, who were still teaching at a very high age are thus not very representative.
Including those older scientists does hardly a¤ect the results.
29If a researcher has more than one specialization his relevant peer group is dened as the sum of the peers
of his specializations.
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using the number of department level dismissals I use the number of specialization level dis-
missals. Similarly, I use the reduction in average peer quality in a researchers specialization
instead of the reduction at the department level.
The results for the specialization level peers are reported in Table 6.30 The estimated
coe¢ cients are very close to 0 and all insignicant not only for publications but also for citation
weighted publications. Furthermore, many results have the wrong sign if one were to expect a
negative dismissal e¤ect.
Both the department and specialization level dismissal results suggest that localized peer
e¤ects may not be very important in this research environment. The following section explores
this in further detail by estimating the peer e¤ects equation (1) instrumenting the endogenous
peer group variables with the dismissal.
6 Using the Dismissal to Identify Localized Peer E¤ects
in Science
6.1 Department Level Peer E¤ects
As suggested by Figures 1 to 3 the dismissal had a strong e¤ect on the peer group of the stayers
at the German universities. I therefore use this exogenous source of variation in a researchers
peer group to identify localized peer e¤ects. I start by analyzing department level peer e¤ects.
As explained in the identication section I estimate two rst stage equations: one for the
number of peers (i.e. department size) and one for the average quality of peers in a researchers
department. The rst stage results are presented in Table 7.
Columns (1) and (2) report the rst stage results for physicists. The rst column shows the
rst stage regression for department size. The number of dismissed physicists in a researchers
department has a very strong and signicant e¤ect on department size. Reassuringly, the
dismissal induced reduction in average peer quality does not have a large e¤ect on department
size. The rst stage regression for average peer quality in physics is presented in column (2).
The number of dismissals in the department does not have a signicant e¤ect on the average
quality of peers. The dismissal induced reduction in peer quality, however, is a very strong and
signicant predictor of average peer quality for physicists. Columns (3) to (6) report the rst
stage regressions for chemists and mathematicians. The results are very similar: the number
of dismissals in a department is a very good predictor for department size and the dismissal
induced reduction in peer quality is a very good predictor for the average quality of peers. The
dismissal is a strong instrument not only for department size but also for the average quality
of peers.
30Due to a small number of missing values for the specialization of a researcher the number of observations
is slightly lower than for the department level specications.
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Table 8 reports results from estimating the peer e¤ects model as proposed in equation
(1). The rst columns of Table 8 show the results for physicists. The OLS results are not
very informative due to the problems illustrated in the identication section. I therefore turn
immediately to discussing the IV results where I use the dismissal to instrument for the peer
group variables.31 Column (2) report the results for publications as the dependent variable.
The coe¢ cients on the peer group variables are very small and never signicantly di¤erent from
0. The coe¢ cient on the number of peers indicates that one can rule out any e¤ects greater than
0.09 with 95 percent condence. The coe¢ cient on average peer quality even has the wrong
sign if one were expecting positive peer e¤ects from interactions with high quality peers. The
standard error implies that one can rule out positive e¤ects greater than 0.03 with 95 percent
condence. These are precisely estimated e¤ects because the mean of the publication variable
is about 0.4. The results for citation weighted publications are very similar, but with larger
coe¢ cient estimates because of the higher mean of the citation weighted publications measure.
The chemistry and mathematics results are reported in the next few columns of Table 8 and
are very similar. The coe¢ cients on department size and on average peer quality are all very
close to 0 and insignicant. For chemistry one can rule out positive e¤ects of department size
larger than 0.021 (0.013 for mathematics) using publications as the dependent variable. For
average peer quality one can rule out positive e¤ects larger than 0.014 (0.082 for mathematics).
These are small e¤ects given the mean of the normalized publication variable which is 0.9 (0.3
in mathematics).
The results presented in Table 8 show no evidence for department level peer e¤ects in any of
the three subjects. The fact that the results are very similar for all three subjects can be seen
as a rst conrmation that there are indeed no department level peer e¤ects in this setting.
Also the fact that I nd very similar results for publications and citation weighted publications
is reassuring. This indicates that di¤erences in citation behavior of articles from scientists in
departments with or without dismissals cannot explain these ndings.
6.2 Specialization Level Peer E¤ects
The results presented in the previous section used the department as the relevant peer group
of scientists. In the following regression I use a researchers specialization to dene his peer
group. The peers of an experimental physicist are now only the other experimentalists in his
department; not theoretical physicists, technical physicists or astrophysicists. The rst stage
results are reported in Table 9 showing that the dismissal is a good predictor for a scientists
31In this setup the instruments are strong predictors of the peer group variables. Furthermore, the model is
just identied as the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables. There is thus no
worry of bias due to weak instruments. Stock and Jogo (2005) characterize instruments to be weak not only if
they lead to biased IV results but also if hypothesis tests of IV parameters su¤er from severe size distortions.
They propose values of the Cragg-Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic for which a Wald test at the 5
percent level will have an actual rejection rate of no more than 10 percent. In this case the critical value is 7.03
and thus always below the Cragg-Donald statistic for the rst stages for physics, chemistry, and mathematics
which is reported at the bottom of Table 8.
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number of (specialization level) peers and their respective quality, especially in physics and
chemistry. For mathematicians the dismissal variables are less signicant because a lot of
mathematicians have many specializations.
Table 10 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with specialization level peer
variables. Similarly to before, all coe¢ cients on the dismissal variables are very small and none
of them is signicantly di¤erent from 0. The peer group variables even have unexpected signs in
many specications. In physics, the standard errors imply than one can rule out positive e¤ects
for the number of peers larger than 0.035 with 95 percent condence when using publications
as the dependent variable. Furthermore, positive e¤ects larger than 0.039 can be ruled out for
the quality of peers. Keeping in mind that the mean of the publication variable is about 0.4 for
physicists these are precisely estimated zeros. Using citation weighted publications gives very
similar results.
For chemistry, one can rule out any positive e¤ect of having one more peer greater than
0.047 with 95 percent condence. It is also possible to rule out positive e¤ects greater than
0.012 with 95 percent condence for the average quality of specialization level peers. These are
again very small coe¢ cients if one considers the mean of the publication variable for chemistry
which is about 0.9.
The results for mathematics are less precisely estimated than for physics and chemistry.
Nonetheless, there is no evidence for any signicant peer e¤ects in mathematics. The results
on peer e¤ects in a researchers specialization support the conclusion that localized peer e¤ects
are not important within academic departments. The following section probes the robustness
of these results before I investigate peer e¤ects among coauthors.
7 Sensitivity of Department Level IV Results
Tables 11 to 13 show results from a number of robustness checks for the department level results.
The physics results are reported in Table 11, chemistry results in Table 12, and mathematics
results in Table 13. As mentioned before, the dismissal may have led to disruption e¤ects
especially in 1933 and 1934. I therefore reestimate the IV results dropping 1933 and 1934 from
the regression. Omitting those turbulent years does not a¤ect my ndings as shown in columns
(1) and (2).
Peer e¤ects may be especially important in the early or the late stages of a scientists career.
I therefore split the sample into two groups: scientists below 50 and scientists 50 or older. The
results are reported in columns (3) to (6). There is no indication that peer e¤ects are especially
important in younger or older years as none of the coe¢ cients is signicantly di¤erent from 0
in any of the subjects.
Furthermore, I check whether high quality or low quality researchers benet more from their
peers by splitting the sample into two di¤erent groups: above median productivity researchers
and below median productivity researchers. With the exception of one coe¢ cient for the average
quality for chemistry which has an unexpected sign, the coe¢ cients are small and insignicant as
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shown in columns (7) to (10). The physics results for the above median productivity scientists,
however, are not precisely estimated due to the weak rst stage in this subgroup.
An important check to rule out di¤erential productivity trends in a¤ected and una¤ected
departments is to include university specic time trends in the regressions. The results for
those specications are reported in columns (11) and (12). Reassuringly, including university
specic time trends hardly a¤ects the results.
A further worry is that stayers may have taken over laboratories or experiments from the
dismissed in the a¤ected departments. The mathematics results should not be contaminated
by such behavior. An additional way of exploring whether this might have happened is by
estimating the regression for theoretical physicists, only. Theoretical physicists did not need
laboratories for their research. Their productivity should therefore not be a¤ected by taking
over laboratories. Columns (13) and (14) of Table 11 show that the results are very similar
for theoretical physicists. None of the coe¢ cients on peer quality is signicantly di¤erent from
0, suggesting that the takeover of laboratories or experiments is unlikely to contaminate the
results.
The robustness checks support the evidence that peer e¤ects are indeed nonexistent at the
department level. In Tables A7 to A9 I also show that the specialization level ndings are
una¤ected by similar changes to the specication. These results therefore strengthen the view
that localized peer e¤ects are not important in scientic research, at least in early 20th century
Germany.
8 E¤ect of Dismissal on Coauthors
This section analyzes peer e¤ects among coauthors. Interactions among coauthors can take
very di¤erent levels of intensity. The most intense form of interaction is the coauthoring of
papers. It is not clear whether one would like to characterize the coauthoring of papers as a
peer e¤ect as opposed to joint production. Below, I will try to investigate di¤erent levels of
cooperation among coauthors. These interactions can also me more subtle than coauthoring.
A possible example is that coauthors discuss each others work which they are not planning
publish together. They may also exert peer pressure on their coauthors by being very productive
or very lazy. These more subtle interactions would be classied as peer e¤ects if one were to
use a stricter denition of peer e¤ects.
I investigate peer interactions among coauthors by analyzing the change in productivity
of scientists who lose a coauthor due to the dismissal. As the fraction of coauthored papers
was very low mathematics, only one mathematician who stayed in Germany lost a coauthor
due to the dismissal. Therefore, I cannot analyze coauthor e¤ects for mathematics. In physics
and chemistry there were enough researchers who lost a coauthor due to the dismissal. Fig-
ure 7 illustrates the impact of losing a coauthor for physics. The gure plots average yearly
publications for two groups of researchers; researchers who lost a high quality coauthor due to
the dismissal and researchers without dismissed coauthors. Figure 7 suggests that physicists
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who lost a prolic coauthor experienced a drop in their research productivity but managed to
recover after some years.
Figure 7: E¤ect of Dismissal of Coauthors Physics
Figure 8 shows the same graph for chemists. The productivity of chemists who lost a
coauthor falls after the dismissal. Similarly to the e¤ect in physics the productivity of chemists
with dismissed coauthors recovers some years after the dismissal.
Figure 8: E¤ect of Dismissal of Coauthors Chemistry
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In the following I investigate the e¤ect of the dismissal in further detail. I therefore estimate
the following reduced form equation:
(5) # Publicationsiut = 1 + 2(# Dismissed Coauthors)iut + 3(Avg. Quality of Dismissed Coauthors)iut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6UniversityFEu + 7IndividualFEi + "iut
I regress the number of publications of researcher i in period t and university u on the
number of dismissed coauthors, the average quality of the dismissed coauthors, and the same
controls as in the regressions reported above. For the basic regression a scientists coauthors are
dened as all colleagues who have coauthored a paper with the scientist in the last ve years
before the dismissal; i.e. from 1928 to 1932. It is important to note that the dismissed coauthors
do not have to be from the same department and indeed they often are in di¤erent universities.
As before I estimate this regression for researchers staying in Germany only. This regression
corresponds to the reduced form regressions reported for the department and specialization
level peers. An equivalent instrumental variable approach as before is not feasible for coauthors
because the timing of the peer interactions cannot be well dened for coauthors. It is neither
clear when peer interactions among coauthors start nor when these interactions stop because
they are likely to interact also before and after they have coauthored papers. I therefore focus
on the reduced form results for coauthors because the dismissal provides a sudden breakup of
the coauthor tie. Investigating how this sudden end of the coauthor collaboration a¤ects the
productivity of stayers will thus shed light on peer e¤ects among coauthors.
The regression estimates of equation (5) are reported in Table 14.32 Columns (1) and (2)
show the results for physics. The coe¢ cient on the number of dismissed coauthors is not
signicantly di¤erent from 0. The coe¢ cient on the average quality of dismissed coauthors
in column (2) indicates that losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the productivity of
a physicist of average quality by about 13 percent. The results for chemists are reported in
columns (3) and (4). The number of dismissed coauthors does not seem to play an important
role for the productivity of chemists. The average quality of the dismissed coauthors is, however,
highly signicant. The estimated coe¢ cient for citation weighted publications indicates that
losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the productivity of an average chemist by about
16.5 percent. The regressions reported in Table 14 use the total number of publications and
citations weighted publications as dependent variable. A coauthored publication is counted as
a full publication for both coauthors. Another approach is to normalize joint publications by
dividing each publication and the citations of each publication by the number of coauthors.
Table 15 shows the results obtained when using normalized (citation weighted) publications as
the dependent variable. The results are very similar to before.
32I am estimating these regressions on the same sample as the department level regressions reported before.
The number of observations di¤ers slightly from the number of observations in the department level specication
because the department level specications include a researcher twice if he has a joint appointment at two
universities (This occurs very rarely. Estimating the department and specialization level with weights to account
for the few researchers who are appointed at two departments does not alter those results). The number of
researchers in the two sets of regressions, however, is exactly the same as can be seen from the number of
included researchers.
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These results show that scientists who lost high quality coauthors su¤ered more than sci-
entists who lost less prolic coauthors. The fact that I do not nd a signicant e¤ect on the
number of dismissed coauthors suggests that this e¤ect is not driven by the fact that researchers
who lost a coauthor published less because they were lamenting the loss of a coauthor.
The e¤ect of losing a coauthor may depend on the time span which elapsed since the last
collaboration. The regressions reported in Table 16 explore this in further detail. I split the
dismissed coauthors into two groups: recent coauthors who had collaborated with a stayer
between 1929 and 1932, and former coauthors who had co-written papers with the stayer
between 1924 and 1928 and not thereafter. As expected, the estimates indicate that only the
dismissal of recent coauthors matters for a stayers productivity. The dismissal of a former
coauthor does not a¤ect the productivity of the stayers.
As mentioned above, it is not clear whether the joint publication of papers can be classied
as a peer e¤ect. I therefore investigate how the dismissal a¤ected the number of publications
excluding joint publications with the dismissed coauthors. Finding a negative e¤ect of the
dismissal on the publications without the dismissed coauthors would suggest the presence of
peer e¤ects among coauthors which are more subtle than coauthoring. This is a powerful test
for spill-over e¤ects because one would expect that researchers who lose a coauthor substitute
towards single-authored publications and publications with other coauthors. Any such substi-
tution should reduce the estimated dismissal e¤ect. The results on publications without the
dismissed coauthors are reported in Table 17. As before the number of dismissed coauthors
does not a¤ect the productivity of scientists. The quality of the dismissed coauthors, however,
remains negative and signicant. These results suggest the presence of peer e¤ects between
coauthors.
9 Conclusion
This paper uses the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government to identify peer e¤ects
in science. I use a newly constructed dataset to estimate a peer e¤ects model including the
number of peers and their average quality as determinants of a researchers productivity. I show
that the dismissal was not correlated with a number of factors which might a¤ect researchers
productivity through other channels than peer e¤ects. I thus claim that the dismissal can be
used as a valid instrument for a scientists peer group. I do not nd evidence for localized peer
e¤ects. These results are very similar for physicists, chemistry, and mathematics and robust to
a number of sensitivity checks.
It is important to note that these results do not imply that being at a good university does
not have a positive e¤ect on a researchers productivity. The regressions reported above include
university xed e¤ects which control for unobserved di¤erences in the quality of laboratories,
research seminars, research students, and the like. My results show that university quality
matters because the null hypothesis that the university xed e¤ects are all zero can easily be
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rejected. There is, however, no evidence for peer e¤ects at the department or specialization
level.
Furthermore, I investigate peer e¤ects among coauthors. The number of coauthors does
not matter for a researchers productivity. The quality of coauthors, however, is important for
the productivity of physicists and chemists. I nd that losing a coauthor of average quality
reduces the productivity of an average scientists by 13 percent in physics and by 16.5 percent
in chemistry. To verify whether this e¤ect constitutes a genuine peer e¤ect as opposed to a
joint production e¤ect I investigate the e¤ect of a dismissed coauthor on publications which
were published without the dismissed coauthor. I nd that the average quality of a dismissed
coauthor leads to a substantial reduction in those publications as well, indicating that peer
e¤ects are indeed important among coauthors.
As mentioned before, my coauthor results are remarkably similar to the results obtained
by Azoulay et. al (2007). They cannot test for localized peer e¤ect in their setup as they
do not observe the universe of researchers at a dying scientists university. They do, however,
show that the coauthor e¤ect is not di¤erent for coauthors who are co-located compared to
coauthors who are located at another university. This supports the view that co-location does
not intensify the collaboration among coauthors and thus that localized peer e¤ects may much
less important than widely believed.
My paper provides evidence on peer e¤ects among scientists in Germany from 1925 to
1938. I have argued that the research environment of early 20th century Germany is very
comparable present day research. I therefore believe that my ndings shed light on peer e¤ects
in science today. If this was indeed the case it is likely that todays localized peer e¤ects are
even less important as communication and transportation costs have fallen dramatically in the
last decades.
The increasing importance of teams, especially multi-university teams, on the other hand
suggests that my estimates of peer e¤ects among coauthors constitute a lower bound as coau-
thored papers have become very common in the sciences.33
These results suggest strong policy conclusions. Co-locating researchers in order to increase
their productivity through spill-overs does not seem a useful policy to increase total research
output. It is probably more important to increase the possibility for coauthorship by fostering
the mobility of researchers and their exposure to researchers with similar research interests. The
funding of conferences and active support of collaborations among researchers may therefore
be a very e¤ective tool to increase total research output.
33See Wuchty et al. (2007) for a description of the increased importance of teams in scientic research.
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10 Tables
Table 1: Number of Dismissed Scientists across di¤erent Subjects
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
% of all % of all % of all
Number of Physicists Number of Chemists Number of Mathematicians
Year of Dismissal Dismissals in 1933 Dismissals in 1933 Dismissals in 1933
1933 33 11.5 50 10.7 35 15.6
1934 6 2.1 11 2.4 6 2.7
1935 4 1.4 5 1.1 5 2.2
1936 1 0.3 7 1.5 1 0.4
1937 1 0.3 3 0.6 2 0.9
1938 1 0.3 4 0.9 1 0.4
1939 1 0.3 2 0.4 1 0.4
1940 1 0.3 0 0.0 1 0.4
1933 - 1934 39 13.6 61 13.1 41 18.3
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Table 3: Quality of Dismissed Scholars
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Dismissed Dismissed Dismissed
33-34 33-34 33-34
Stay- % Stay- % Stay- %
All ers # Loss All ers # Loss All ers # Loss
Researchers 287 248 39 13.6 466 405 61 13.1 224 183 41 18.3
(Beginning of 1933)
# of Chaired Profs. 109 97 12 11.0 156 136 20 12.8 117 99 18 15.4
Average Age (1933) 49.5 50.2 45.1 - 50.4 50.5 49.7 - 48.7 50.0 43.0 -
# of Nobel Laureates 15 9 6 40.0 14 11 3 21.4 - - - -
Avg. publications 0.47 0.43 0.71 20.5 1.69 1.59 2.31 17.9 0.33 0.27 0.56 31.1
(1925-1932)
Avg. publications 5.10 3.53 14.79 39.4 17.25 16.07 25.05 19.0 1.45 0.93 3.71 46.8
(citation weighted)
% Publ. coauthored 33.3 33.6 31.6 - 76.0 75.8 77.1 - 11.3 9.7 14.8 -
% Publ. coauthored 10.6 9.9 13.9 - 11.7 12.1 9.7 - 6.3 5.9 6.7 -
(Coaut. at German uni)
% Publ. coauthored 4.2 3.4 8.7 - 5.1 5.4 3.8 - 2.7 2.0 4.1 -
(Coaut. same uni)
% Loss is calculated as the fraction of the dismissals among all researchers or as the fraction of Nobel Laureates, publications, and
citation weighted publications which were contributed by the dismissed.
Table 4: Top Journals
Journal Name Published in
General Journals
Naturwissenschaften Germany
Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Physikalisch Mathematische Klasse Germany
Nature UK
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A (Mathematics and Physics) UK
Science USA
Physics
Annalen der Physik Germany
Physikalische Zeitschrift Germany
Physical Review USA
Chemistry
Berichte der Deutschen Chemischen Gesellschaft Germany
Biochemische Zeitschrift Germany
Journal für Praktische Chemie Germany
Justus Liebigs Annalen der Chemie Germany
Kolloid Zeitschrift Germany
Zeitschrift für Anorganische Chemie und Allgemeine Chemie Germany
Zeitschrift für Elektrochemie und Angewandte Physikalische Chemie Germany
Zeitschrift für Physikalische Chemie Germany
Journal of the Chemical Society UK
Mathematics
Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik Germany
Mathematische Annalen Germany
Mathematische Zeitschrift Germany
Zeitschrift für angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik Germany
Acta Mathematica Sweden
Journal of the London Mathematical Society UK
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society UK
Another major journal for physicists at the time was the "Zeitschrift für Physik". Unfortunately, the Web of Science does not
include the articles in that journal after 1927. Therefore, I exclude the "Zeitschrift für Physik" from the analysis.
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Table 5: Reduced Form (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation
Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted
Dependent Variable: cations cations Publ. Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ.
Number Dismissed -0.009 -0.011 -0.036 -0.075 -0.009 -0.008 -0.100 -0.051 -0.012 -0.013 -0.034 -0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.255) (0.268) (0.006) (0.006) (0.142) (0.139) (0.012) (0.013) (0.139) (0.134)
Dismissal Induced 0.027 0.025 0.423 0.418 0.024 0.022 0.722 0.692 0.006 0.015 -0.664 -0.424
# in Peer Quality (0.018) (0.018) (0.264) (0.292) (0.018) (0.018) (0.400) (0.417) (0.027) (0.033) (0.408) (0.309)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Observations 2261 2261 2261 2261 3584 3584 3584 3584 1538 1538 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 258 258 258 413 413 413 413 183 183 183 183
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.25 0.68 0.69 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.18 0.19
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at department level)
Publications is the sum of a scientists publications in top journals in one year (normalized by the number of coauthors).
Citation Weighted Publications are dened as the sum of subsequent citations (in the rst 50 years after publication in any journal included in the "Web of Science", including international
journals) of all articles published in a given year (normalized by the number of coauthors).
Number dismissed is equal to the number of dismissed scientists in a researchers department. The variable is 0 until 1933 for researchers in all departments. In 1934 it is equal to the number of
dismissals in 1933 at a researchers department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 and 1934 in a researchers department.
Dismissal induced # in Peer Quality is 0 for all researchers until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to (Avg. quality of total department before dismissal) - (Avg. quality of researchers not dismissed in
1933) if this number > 0. From 1935 onwards it will be equal to (Avg. quality of total department before dismissal) - (Avg. quality of researchers not dismissed in 1933 and 1934) if this number
is > 0. Scientists in departments with above average quality dismissals will have a positive value of the quality dismissal variable after 1933 and a value of 0 until 1933. The variable will always
be 0 for all other scientists. Average quality is measured as the department level average of citation weighted publications between 1925 and 1932 such that any changes after the dismissal do not
a¤ect the values of this average.
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Table 6: Reduced Form (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation
Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted Publi- Publi- Weighted Weighted
Dependent Variable: cations cations Publ. Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ. cations cations Publ. Publ.
Number Dismissed 0.022 0.014 0.454 0.385 -0.003 -0.000 0.272 0.400 -0.026 -0.028 0.064 0.083
(0.025) (0.023) (0.382) (0.384) (0.023) (0.024) (0.608) (0.572) (0.026) (0.027) (0.290) (0.305)
Dismissal Induced 0.025 0.027 0.415 0.413 0.006 0.005 0.042 -0.003 0.018 0.033 -0.540 -0.401
# in Peer Quality (0.021) (0.021) (0.322) (0.322) (0.009) (0.009) (0.132) (0.124) (0.030) (0.036) (0.322) (0.327)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 2257 2257 2257 2257 3567 3567 3567 3567 1538 1538 1538 1538
# of researchers 256 256 256 256 405 405 405 405 183 183 183 183
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.25 0.26 0.68 0.69 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.18 0.19
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors are clustered at the department level)
Number dismissed is equal to the number of dismissed scientists within the same specialization as the researcher (e.g. it will be equal to the number of dismissed theoretical physicists at a
researchers department for a theoretical physicist). The variable is 0 until 1933 for all researchers. In 1934 it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 at a researchers specialization. From
1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 and 1934 in a researchers specialization.
Dismissal induced # in Peer Quality is 0 for all researchers until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to (Avg. quality of all researchers within a specialization in the scientists department before dismissal) -
(Avg. quality of researchers within a specialization in a scientists not dismissed in 1933) if this number is >0. From 1935 onwards it is equal to (Avg. quality of all researchers within a specialization
in the scientists department before dismissal) - (Avg. quality of researchers within a specialization in a scientists not dismissed in 1933 or 1934) if this number is >0. Scientists in specializations
with above average quality dismissals will have a positive value of the quality dismissal variable after 1933 and a value of 0 until 1933. The variable will always be 0 for all other scientists. Average
quality is measured as the specialization level average of citation weighted publications between 1925 and 1932 such that any changes after the dismissal do not a¤ect the values of this average.
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Table 7: First Stages (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Avg. Quality Department Avg. Quality Department Avg. Quality
Dependent Variable: Size of Peers Size of Peers Size of Peers
Number Dismissed -0.552 0.029 -0.962 0.016 -0.511 0.104
(0.123)** (0.136) (0.105)** (0.119) (0.046)** (0.041)*
Dismissal Induced -0.082 -0.668 -0.019 -1.203 0.135 -1.531
# in Peer Quality (0.177) (0.198)** (0.181) (0.271)** (0.175) (0.123)**
Age Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 2261 2261 3584 3584 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 258 413 413 183 183
R-squared 0.93 0.61 0.94 0.66 0.86 0.73
F - Test on Instruments 82.5 43.4 44.8 10.4 82.0 90.6
Table 8: Instrumental Variables (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Dependent Variable: Publications Cit. Weighted Pub. Publications Cit. Weighted Pub. Publications Cit. Weighted Pub.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Department Size -0.001 0.017 -0.141 0.103 -0.006 0.008 0.013 0.043 0.006 0.025 0.055 0.098
(0.004) (0.034) (0.081) (0.559) (0.004) (0.006) (0.147) (0.129) (0.012) (0.024) (0.072) (0.281)
Peer Quality 0.001 -0.039 -0.081 -0.638 0.003 -0.018 0.056 -0.575 0.021 -0.008 0.541 0.285
(0.004) (0.036) (0.086) (0.609) (0.003) (0.016) (0.045) (0.289) (0.014) (0.021) (0.174)** (0.218)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 2261 2261 2261 2261 3584 3584 3584 3584 1538 1538 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 258 258 258 413 413 413 413 183 183 183 183
R-Squared 0.39 0.25 0.69 0.50 0.34 0.20
Cragg-Donald EV Statistic 14.41 14.41 60.25 60.25 72.56 72.56
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
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Table 9: First Stages (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Avg. Quality Department Avg. Quality Department Avg. Quality
Dependent Variable: Size of Peers Size of Peers Size of Peers
Number Dismissed -0.810 0.254 -1.011 0.625 -0.373 0.002
(0.147)** (0.201) (0.105)** (0.740) (0.142)* (0.152)
Dismissal Induced 0.060 -0.854 0.049 -0.972 -0.242 -0.613
# in Peer Quality (0.041) (0.314)* (0.036) (0.099)** (0.139) (0.552)
Age Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 2257 2257 3567 3567 1538 1538
# of researchers 256 256 405 405 183 183
R-squared 0.92 0.57 0.92 0.67 0.88 0.65
F - Test on Instruments 15.5 4.9 46.4 72.4 49.1 0.9
Table 10: Instrumental Variables (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Publications Cit. Weighted Pub. Publications Cit. Weighted Pub. Publications Cit. Weighted Pub.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Number of Peers in -0.003 -0.027 -0.257 -0.641 -0.027 -0.003 -0.219 -0.407 -0.001 0.076 0.011 -0.220
Specialization (0.012) (0.031) (0.187) (0.550) (0.014) (0.024) (0.224) (0.565) (0.016) (0.095) (0.127) (0.733)
Average Peer Quality 0.003 -0.033 -0.062 -0.529 0.002 -0.006 0.022 -0.018 0.011 -0.084 0.377 0.740
(0.004) (0.035) (0.052) (0.555) (0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.130) (0.016) (0.153) (0.152)* (0.763)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 2257 2257 2257 2257 3567 3567 3567 3567 1538 1538 1538 1538
# of researchers 256 256 256 256 405 405 405 405 183 183 183 183
R-Squared 0.39 0.25 0.69 0.50 0.34 0.20
Cragg-Donald EV Statistic 108.76 108.76 50.86 50.86 5.89 5.89
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
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Table 11: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Physics (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full Theor. Theor.
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample Physics Physics
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
Department Size -0.029 -0.106 0.077 1.618 -0.002 -0.993 0.020 0.346 0.352 5.007 0.056 0.171 -0.022 -0.728
(0.035) (0.679) (0.050) (1.280) (0.070) (0.783) (0.015) (0.340) (1.929) (25.722) (0.059) (0.556) (0.061) (1.196)
Peer Quality 0.010 -0.574 -0.069 -1.644 -0.006 0.785 0.017 -0.036 -0.527 -7.835 -0.067 -0.520 -0.086 -0.959
(0.044) (0.680) (0.062) (1.559) (0.087) (1.218) (0.019) (0.228) (2.448) (32.287) (0.082) (0.672) (0.089) (1.723)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. X X
Time Trends
Observations 1866 1866 1203 1203 1058 1058 1036 1036 1143 1143 2261 2261 464 464
# of researchers 256 256 181 181 147 147 128 128 112 112 258 258 50 50
EV Statistic 10.48 10.48 5.24 5.24 3.44 3.44 17.97 17.97 0.50 0.50 7.26 7.26 5.86 5.86
Table 12: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Chemistry (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
Department Size 0.012 0.157 0.002 -0.017 0.006 -0.067 0.006 -0.047 0.019 0.249 0.008 -0.121
(0.009) (0.105) (0.013) (0.344) (0.011) (0.136) (0.007) (0.082) (0.018) (0.254) (0.013) (0.279)
Peer Quality -0.015 -0.349 -0.012 -0.681 -0.020 -0.277 -0.014 -0.208 -0.036 -1.221 0.015 -0.837
(0.017) (0.192) (0.036) (0.633) (0.027) (0.349) (0.014) (0.215) (0.024) (0.585)* (0.056) (0.748)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. X X
Time Trends
Observations 2926 2926 1825 1825 1759 1759 1725 1725 1768 1768 3584 3584
# of researchers 411 411 265 265 241 241 204 204 187 187 413 413
EV Statistic 59.88 59.88 21.22 21.22 48.22 48.22 42.74 42.74 22.40 22.40 14.77 14.77
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
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Table 13: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Mathematics (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
Department Size 0.033 0.242 0.049 -0.059 -0.012 -0.246 0.035 -0.289 -0.005 0.318 0.017 -0.107
(0.042) (0.508) (0.028) (0.315) (0.039) (0.470) (0.029) (0.320) (0.031) (0.454) (0.016) (0.240)
Peer Quality -0.018 0.315 -0.020 0.375 0.028 0.081 -0.006 0.209 0.022 0.657 0.006 0.378
(0.026) (0.277) (0.034) (0.302) (0.021) (0.347) (0.032) (0.173) (0.026) (0.363) (0.025) (0.273)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. Time X X
Trends
Observations 1256 1256 899 899 639 639 844 844 644 644 1538 1538
# of researchers 183 183 125 125 97 97 106 106 67 67 183 183
EV Statistic 19.18 19.18 41.16 41.16 20.82 20.82 30.51 30.51 34.71 34.71 68.30 68.30
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)46
Table 14: E¤ect of Dismissal on Coauthors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physics Chemistry
Citation Citation
Publi- Weighted Publi- Weighted
Dependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
# of Dismissed Coauthors 0.363 8.449 0.419 -0.394
(0.574) (8.570) (0.349) (5.478)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors -0.007 -0.128 -0.013 -0.165
(0.003)* (0.047)** (0.003)** (0.037)**
Age Dummies X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
University FE X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
# of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.54
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at the individual level)
Table 15: Coauthors: Normalized Publications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physics Chemistry
Citation Citation
Publi- Weighted Publi- Weighted
Dependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
# of Dismissed Coauthors 0.684 10.503 0.279 -0.285
(0.623) (7.637) (0.183) (3.573)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors -0.014 -0.244 -0.015 -0.161
(0.008) (0.094)* (0.004)** (0.068)*
Age Dummies X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
University FE X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
# of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.39 0.26 0.68 0.49
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at the individual level)
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Table 16: Coauthors: Timing of Coauthorship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physics Chemistry
Citation Citation
Publi- Weighted Publi- Weighted
Dependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
Coauthors 1930 - 1932
# of Dismissed Coauthors 0.359 8.944 0.114 -6.177
(0.636) (8.516) (0.556) (10.365)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors -0.007 -0.126 -0.013 -0.163
(0.003)* (0.040)** (0.003)** (0.047)**
Coauthors 1924 - 1929 (not later)
# of Dismissed Coauthors -0.030 -2.725 0.008 0.231
(0.978) (23.682) (0.398) (4.556)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors 0.007 0.118 0.004 0.069
(0.019) (0.440) (0.004) (0.068)
Age Dummies X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
University FE X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
# of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.54
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at the individual level)
Table 17: Coauthors: Publications without dismissed Coauthors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physics Chemistry
Citation Citation
Publi- Weighted Publi- Weighted
Dependent Variable cations Pub. cations Pub.
Coauthors 1930 - 1932
# of Dismissed Coauthors 0.510 12.814 0.311 -6.859
(0.662) (10.669) (0.546) (14.775)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors -0.007 -0.144 -0.012 -0.286
(0.003)* (0.050)** (0.003)** (0.068)**
Coauthors 1924 - 1929 (not later)
# of Dismissed Coauthors 0.007 0.142 0.003 0.065
(0.019) (0.490) (0.004) (0.070)
Avg. Quality of Dism. Coauthors 0.028 -3.465 0.009 -1.128
(0.970) (26.113) (0.394) (5.287)
Age Dummies X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
University FE X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Observations 2243 2243 3575 3575
# of researchers 258 258 413 413
R-squared 0.39 0.28 0.67 0.53
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level
(All standard errors are clustered at the individual level)
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11 Appendix
Sample Page from List of Displaced German Scholars
Squares were added by the author to highlight the researchers who had already received the Noble prize or were to receive it after
1936.
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Table A1: Specializations
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
% scientists % scientists % scientists
in speciali- in speciali- in speciali-
Specialization zation Specialization zation Specialization zation
Experimental Physics 48.5 Organic Chemistry 26.6 Analysis 45.9
Theoretical Physics 22.3 Physical Chemistry 23.8 Applied Mathematics 36.2
Technical Physics 20.6 Technical Chemistry 19.4 Algebra 19.7
Astronomy 14.7 Anorganic Chemistry 18.6 Number Theory 13.5
Pharmacology 10.2 Metha Mathematics 5.2
Medical Chemistry 8.0 Topology 4.8
Biochemistry 6.7 Foundations of Math. 4.4
Percentages add to more than 100 percent because some physicists and chemists have two specializations. Mathematicians have up
to four specializations.
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Table A2: Top Researchers 1925-1932 (Citation weighted Publications Measure)
University First Second Third Avg. Cit Avg. Nobel Dis-
Name beginning Special- Special- Special- weighted Publ. Prize missed
of 1933 ization ization ization Publ. 33-34
Physics
Fritz London Berlin Theo. Phy. 149.3 1.3 X
Lother Nordheim Göttingen Theo. Phy. 110.0 0.7 X
Gerhard Herzberg Darmstadt TU Exp. Phy. 78.0 2.0 X
Carl Ramsauer Berlin TU Exp. Phy. 75.6 3.0
Max Born Göttingen Theo. Phy. 62.5 1.3 X X
Hans Falkenhagen Köln Theo. Phy. 57.5 1.9
Arnold Sommerfeld München Theo. Phy. 44.4 1.8
Eugen Wigner Berlin TU Theo. Phy. 44.3 0.5 X X
Heinrich Kuhn Göttingen Exp. Phy. Theo. Phy. 42.0 4.0 X
Harry Dember Dresden TU Exp. Phy. 40.8 1.0 X
Karl Herzfeld Theo. Phy. 33.7 1.3
Richard Gans Königsberg Exp. Phy. 29.4 1.6
Walter Gerlach München Exp. Phy. 29.1 3.1
Wolfgang Pauli Theo. Phy. 28.0 3.8 X
Max Wien Jena Exp. Phy. 25.4 2.0
Werner Heisenberg Leipzig Theo. Phy. 25.3 1.0 X
Ludwig Prandtl Göttingen Tech. P. 23.3 1.1
Fritz Kirchner München Exp. Phy. 22.5 2.5
Johannes Malsch Köln Exp. Phy. 22.0 1.5
Emil Rupp Berlin TU Exp. Phy. 21.4 5.2 X
Chemistry
Werner Kuhn Karlsruhe TU Physical C. 262.0 7.0
Max Bergmann Dresden TU Organic C. Biochem. 250.2 6.8 X
Karl Lohmann Heidelberg Medical C. 224.0 6.0
Ernst Bergmann Berlin Physical C. 223.3 17.0 X
Carl Neuberg Berlin Biochem. 184.9 15.1
Carl Wagner Jena Physical C. 177.5 5.0
Otto Meyerhof Heidelberg Medical C. 176.3 5.8 X
Otto Ru¤ Breslau TU Anorganic C. 133.4 7.2
Wolfgang Ostwald Leipzig Anorganic C. 127.0 8.6
Hermann Staudinger Freiburg Organic C. 126.8 8.5 X
Gustav Tammann Göttingen Physical. C. 118.4 19.0
Michael Polanyi Berlin TU Physical. C. 116.8 5.6 X
Max Volmer Berlin TU Physical. C. 114.0 4.2
Karl Freudenberg Heidelberg Organic C. 111.8 7.0
Ulrich Hofmann Berlin TU Anorganic C. Physical C. 109.0 6.0
Richard Johann Kuhn Heidelberg Physical C. Medical C. 92.1 8.0 X
Max Trautz Heidelberg Physical C. 91.9 5.3
Wilhelm Klemm Hannover TU Anorganic. C. 91.4 5.2
Mathematics
Johann von Neumann Berlin Applied Math Foundations Analysis 36.3 1.5 X
Richard Courant Göttingen Analysis Applied Math 22.3 1.3 X
Richard von Mises Berlin Applied Math Analysis 15.6 0.9 X
Heinz Hopf Algebra Topology Geometry 13.3 1.3
Paul Epstein Frankfurt Geometry Number Th. Algebra 11.5 0.6
Oskar Perron München Algebra Analysis 10.6 1.5
Willy Prager Göttingen Applied Math 10.0 0.4 X
Gabiel Szegö Königsberg Applied Math Geometry 9.4 1.4 X
Werner Rogosinski Königsberg Number Th. Analysis 9.1 0.6
Wolfgang Krull Erlangen Algebra 8.9 1.4
Erich Rothe Breslau TU Analysis Applied Math 8.0 1.0 X
Hans Peterssonn Hamburg Number Th. Analysis 8.0 2.0
Adolf Hammerstein Berlin Number Th. Analysis 8.0 0.5
Alexander Weinstein Breslau TU Applied Math 6.3 0.7 X
Erich Kamke Tübingen Number Th.. Foundations Analysis 6.3 0.8
Hellmuth Kneser Greifswald Applied Math Analysis Topology 6.3 0.6
Bartel van der Waerden Leipzig Algebra Geometry 5.8 1.8
Max Müller Heidelberg Analysis 5.3 0.3
Richard Brauer Königsberg Algebra 5.0 0.6 X
Leon Lichtenstein Leipzig Analysis Applied Math 4.9 1.5 X
The university in 1933 is missing for researchers, who retire before before 1933.
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Table A3: Probability of Being Ever Promoted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Promotion Dummy Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Specialization Department Specialization Department Specialization
Peer Group: Level Level Level Level Level Level
Number Dismissed 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 0.019 0.028
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.025)
Dismissal Induced -0.012 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.023 -0.019
# in Peer Quality (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.022) (0.038)
Age Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 2261 2257 3584 3567 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 256 413 405 183 183
R-squared 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82
Table A4: Signing Support List for Hitler
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Signing Support List Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Specialization Department Specialization Department Specialization
Peer Group Level Level Level Level Level Level
Number Dismissed -0.019 -0.016 -0.000 -0.000 -0.027 -0.029
(0.024) (0.013) (0.001) (0.003) (0.065) (0.036)
Dismissal Induced 0.047 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.047 -0.082
# in Peer Quality (0.034) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.138) (0.064)
Age Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Observations 202 202 332 329 144 144
# of researchers 202 202 332 329 144 144
R-squared 0.60 0.61 0.50 0.50 0.64 0.65
Table A5: Notgemeinschaft Funding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Received Funding Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Specialization Department Specialization Department Specialization
Peer Group: Level Level Level Level Level Level
Number Dismissed 0.035 0.022 -0.006 -0.031 0.002 0.009
(0.026) (0.051) (0.015) (0.043) (0.010) (0.025)
Dismissal Induced -0.082 -0.007 0.016 0.000 -0.004 -0.008
# in Peer Quality (0.031)* (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Age Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 347 347 567 565 244 244
# of researchers 228 228 367 365 161 161
R-squared 0.79 0.77 0.71 0.71 0.60 0.60
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
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Table A6: Placebo Dismissal (Moving Dismissal to 1930)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Publications Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Department Specialization Department Specialization Department Specialization
Peer Group: Level Level Level Level Level Level
Number Dismissed 0.025 0.006 -0.006 -0.061 -0.001 -0.029
(0.033) (0.024) (0.013) (0.084) (0.023) (0.047)
Dismissal Induced -0.031 0.022 -0.000 0.013 0.028 0.034
# in Peer Quality (0.042) (0.017) (0.022) (0.007) (0.055) (0.050)
Age Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Observations 1314 1310 2051 2041 875 875
# of researchers 237 235 389 383 170 170
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.75 0.75 0.39 0.39
Table A7: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Physics (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full Theor. Theor.
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample Physics Physics
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
# of Peers in -0.056 -1.010 0.021 0.611 -0.005 -0.494 0.003 0.277 -0.039 -1.482 -0.012 -0.431 0.097 -2.751
Specialization (0.044) (0.711) (0.031) (0.647) (0.031) (0.645) (0.017) (0.292) (0.059) (1.282) (0.041) (0.662) (1.030) (15.667)
Avg. Peer Quality -0.050 -0.743 0.001 0.037 -0.078 -1.551 0.006 0.068 -0.095 -1.368 -0.034 -0.559 -0.065 -0.309
(0.050) (0.680) (0.009) (0.120) (0.073) (1.074) (0.006) (0.057) (0.099) (1.523) (0.037) (0.600) (0.240) (3.546)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. Time X X
Trends
Observations 1863 1863 1199 1199 1058 1058 1032 1032 1143 1143 2257 2257 464 464
# of researchers 254 254 179 179 147 147 126 126 112 112 256 256 50 50
EV Statistic 61.17 61.17 26.91 26.91 43.08 43.08 71.06 71.06 30.91 30.91 98.20 98.20 0.16 0.16
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
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Table A8: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Chemistry (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
# of Peers in 0.009 -0.144 -0.016 -0.683 0.016 -0.468 0.013 -0.374 -0.002 -0.302 -0.009 -0.889
Specialization (0.029) (0.379) (0.046) (1.487) (0.022) (0.345) (0.031) (0.445) (0.086) (0.958) (0.041) (0.747)
Avg. Peer Quality -0.005 0.088 0.004 -0.071 -0.010 -0.078 -0.001 -0.027 -0.016 -0.154 -0.007 -0.031
(0.009) (0.144) (0.013) (0.261) (0.009) (0.084) (0.006) (0.118) (0.010) (0.142) (0.006) (0.164)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. Time X X
Trends
Observations 2913 2913 1815 1815 1752 1752 1713 1713 1767 1767 3567 3567
# of researchers 404 404 261 261 236 236 199 199 186 186 405 405
EV Statistic 38.97 38.97 14.14 14.14 64.73 64.73 23.26 23.26 26.00 26.00 41.32 41.32
Table A9: Robustness Checks Instrumental Variables Mathematics (Specialization Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
omitting omitting younger younger 50 or 50 or  med.  med. > med. > med. Full Full
Sample 33 & 34 33 & 34 than 50 than 50 older older quality quality quality quality Sample Sample
Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig. Publi- Cit weig.
Dep.Variable cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ. cations Publ.
# of Peers in -5.767 17.774 0.094 -0.178 -0.118 -1.935 0.054 -0.363 0.192 2.848 0.060 -1.288
Specialization (342.329) (1076.989) (0.088) (0.564) (0.171) (2.582) (0.049) (0.411) (0.905) (8.984) (0.267) (3.297)
Avg. Peer Quality 4.823 -14.321 -0.176 1.157 0.092 1.213 -0.031 0.197 -0.325 -3.036 -0.144 2.819
(284.859) (896.572) (0.352) (1.764) (0.104) (1.723) (0.034) (0.240) (0.944) (10.018) (0.787) (10.663)
Age Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Uni specic. Time X X
Trends
Observations 1256 1256 899 899 639 639 844 844 644 644 1538 1538
# of researchers 183 183 125 125 97 97 106 106 67 67 183 183
EV Statistic 0.00 0.00 4.29 4.29 3.34 3.34 32.61 32.61 0.62 0.62 1.11 1.11
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the department level)
54
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
909 Tomer Blumkin 
Yossi Hadar 
Eran Yashiv 
The Macroeconomic Role of Unemployment 
Compensation 
908 Natalie Chen 
Dennis Novy 
International Trade Integration: A 
Disaggregated Approach 
907 Dongshu Ou To Leave or Not to Leave? A Regression 
Discontinuity Analysis of the Impact of Failing 
the High School Exit Exam 
906 Andrew B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen J. Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
The Margins of US Trade 
905 Gianluca Benigno 
Bianca De Paoli 
On the International Dimension of Fiscal 
Policy 
904 Stephen J. Redding Economic Geography: A Review of the 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
903 Andreas Georgiadis 
Alan Manning 
Change and Continuity Among Minority 
Communities in Britain 
902 Maria Bas Trade, Technology Adoption and Wage 
Inequalities: Theory and Evidence 
901 Holger Breinlich 
Chiara Criscuolo 
Service Traders in the UK 
900 Emanuel Ornelas 
John L. Turner 
Protection and International Sourcing 
899 Kosuke Aoki 
Takeshi Kimura 
Central Bank's Two-Way Communication with 
the Public and Inflation Dynamics 
898 Alan Manning 
Farzad Saidi 
Understanding the Gender Pay Gap: What’s 
Competition Got to Do with It? 
897 David M. Clark 
Richard Layard 
Rachel Smithies 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapy: 
Initial Evaluation of the Two Demonstration 
Sites 
896 Giorgio Barba Navaretti 
Riccardo Faini 
Alessandra Tucci 
Does Family Control Affect Trade 
Performance? Evidence for Italian Firms 
895 Jang Ping Thia Why Capital Does Not Migrate to the South: A 
New Economic Geography Perspective 
894 Kristian Behrens 
Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
Survival of the Fittest in Cities: 
Agglomeration, Selection and Polarisation 
893 Sharon Belenzon 
Mark Schankerman 
Motivation and Sorting in Open Source 
Software Innovation 
892 Guy Michaels 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Stephen J. Redding 
Urbanization and Structural Transformation 
891 Nicholas Bloom 
Christos Genakos 
Ralf Martin 
Raffaella Sadun 
Modern Management: Good for the 
Environment or Just Hot Air? 
890 Paul Dolan 
Robert Metcalfe 
Comparing willingness-to-pay and subjective 
well- being in the context of non-market goods 
889 Alberto Galasso 
Mark Schankerman 
Patent Thickets and the Market for Innovation: 
Evidence from Settlement of Patent Disputes 
888 Raffaella Sadun Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent 
Retailers? 
887 Bernardo Guimaraes 
Kevin Sheedy 
Sales and Monetary Policy 
886 Andrew E. Clark 
David Masclet 
Marie-Claire Villeval 
Effort and Comparison Income 
Experimental and Survey Evidence 
885 Alex Bryson 
Richard B. Freeman 
How Does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic 
Performance in the UK? 
884 Paul Willman 
Rafael Gomez 
Alex Bryson 
Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the 
Manufacture of Voice 
883 Jang Ping Thia The Impact of Trade on Aggregate 
Productivity and Welfare with Heterogeneous 
Firms and Business Cycle Uncertainty 
882 Richard B. Freeman When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and 
Responses to Shirking 
881 Alex Bryson 
Michael White 
Organizational Commitment: Do Workplace 
Practices Matter? 
880 Mariano Bosch 
Marco Manacorda 
Minimum Wages and Earnings Inequality in 
Urban Mexico.  Revisiting the Evidence 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
